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ABSTRACT 
 Some scholarship and political experts describe voter ID laws as a form of voter 
suppression because they make it harder for certain groups of people to vote. First, this thesis 
considers the historical backdrop of voter discrimination resulting in the passage of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, and subsequent state uses of registration and voter ID laws. Then, this study 
reviews the theoretical foundation of freedom of expression as developed by Thomas Emerson and 
individual and social free expression values, including the social value of self-governance 
explicated by Alexander Meiklejohn. Some scholars also suggest that voter ID laws may be more 
closely scrutinized by courts if challenged under explicit provisions of state constitutions that grant 
voters a fundamental right to vote. This thesis begins its analysis by examining state voter ID laws 
that the National Council of State Legislatures identified in effect in 2018. Next, the study reviews 
how courts analyzed voter ID laws since the U.S. Supreme Court’s approval of a strict ID law in 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board in 2008. Overall, this thesis found only a few examples 
where courts used First Amendment rationales and any associated free expression values when 
addressing ID laws. More commonly, courts applied the Burdick balancing test as prescribed by 
Crawford to uphold the law using two common rationales, either the plaintiff did not meet their 
burden of proving a significant burden on voters or the state’s interest of preventing fraud 
outweighed any burden on voting rights. Finally, this thesis recommends that all courts review 
voter ID laws under a strict scrutiny analysis with the state having the burden of proof and demand 
that states justify why certain types of photo IDs are deemed unacceptable.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court described the right to vote as “a fundamental political 
right” in its 1972 decision, Dunn v. Blumstein.1 Voting allows citizens to choose leaders, policy 
positions, and to influence democracy.2 Representatives may ignore citizens who cannot or do 
not vote.3 Voter identification laws have been contentious since 1950 when South Carolina first 
required some form of identification at the polls.4 Within the past decade, however, stricter forms 
of voter identification requirements have surfaced.5  
Some scholarship and political experts describe voter identification laws as forms of 
voter suppression because they make it harder for certain groups of people to vote.6 In fact, 
political scientists Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, and Lindsay Neilson found in a 2017 study 
that strict identification laws have a negative impact on turnout of racial and ethnic minorities in 
both primary and general elections.7 Also, the group found that these laws tend to “skew 
democracy toward those on the political right.”8 
Voter identification laws are one of the many reasons Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton 
raised as to why she lost the 2016 Presidential Election in What Happened.9 For example, in 
Wisconsin, where Secretary Clinton only lost the state by about 22,000 votes, she cites a 
Priorities USA study to estimate that a new voter ID law helped reduce turnout by 200,000 
                                                          
1 Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Voting is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 471-72 (2015). See Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).  
2 Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, & Lindsay Nielson, Voter identification laws and the suppression of minority 
votes. 79 J. POL. 363, 363 (2017). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, WHAT HAPPENED 420 (Simon & Schuster, 1st ed. 2017). 
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votes.10 Wisconsin was vital for Clinton’s projected path to victory because Democrats had won 
the state in every presidential election since 1992.11 A Republican representative from Wisconsin 
predicted before the election that the new law would help President Donald Trump “pull off an 
upset in the state.”12  
Clinton elaborated that the Associated Press documented subsequent voter denials due to 
the voter ID law: a Navy veteran with an out-of-state driver’s license, a college student using a 
college ID that lacked an expiration date, and a senior woman with chronic lung disease who had 
merely lost her license.13 Conversely, in Illinois, where the state instituted measures to make 
voting more accessible, turnout was up more than five percent.14 Clinton states that turnout, 
especially among African-Americans, was 14 points higher in Illinois than Wisconsin.15  
American historian, Alexander Keyssar, noted that leading up to the 2008 Presidential 
Election, Republicans pressed state legislatures to pass legislation that required all prospective 
voters to present government-issued photo identifications when they showed up at polls.16 
Existing identification requirements varied from state to state, so Republicans argued that this 
state of affairs was an invitation for voter fraud.17 According to opinion polls, the idea has 
popular support.18 In an age where you need identification to board an airplane or enter an office 
building, many people feel that it is not unreasonable to impose similar safeguards at the ballot 
box.19 Also, photo identification requirements would restore “integrity” of American elections 
                                                          
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 384. 
12 Id. at 420.  
13 Id. at 421.  
14 Id. at 420. 
15 Id. 
16 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 283 
(Basic Books, 2nd ed. 2009). 
17 Id. at 283-84. 
18 Id. at 284. 
19 Id.  
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among “legitimate” voters who worried about the possibility of fraud, especially in the wake of 
the 2000 Presidential election debacle in Florida.20 For the first time since 1888, the candidate 
winning the highest number of popular votes, Democrat Al Gore, was not the candidate who won 
the Presidency in the Electoral College vote, Republican George W. Bush.21  
The Washington Post, however, found only four documented cases of voter fraud out of 
the 136 million votes cast in the 2016 election.22 In fact, one example included an Iowa woman 
who voted twice for Trump.23 Trump’s lawyers even said in a Michigan court, “All available 
evidence suggests that the 2016 general election was not tainted by fraud or mistake.”24  
Nonetheless, a problem lies in identification laws that suppress specific segments of the 
electorate, namely low-income and African American voters.25 A Brennan Center study of voter 
identification laws instituted since 2010 indicates that voter restriction laws vary by state.26 The 
website categorizes the restrictions to voting to include making it harder to register to vote, 
cutting back on early voting hours and days, and making it more challenging to restore voting 
rights to persons convicted of felonies.27 In 2016, fourteen states had these various types of new 
voting restrictions in place for the first time, including Wisconsin.28  
Although Louisiana did not impose any new voter restrictions for the 2016 Presidential 
Election, Louisiana has a unique history of voter suppression attempts.29 When Senator John 
                                                          
20 Id. 
21 Id.  
22 Clinton, supra note 9, at 420.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 New Voting Restrictions in Place for 2016 Presidential Election, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/new-voting-restrictions-2010-election (last visited November 21, 2017).   
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  
29 ELECTION 1986: THE BREAUX/MOORE DEBATE, LPB Digital Collection, 
http://ladigitalmedia.org/video_v2/asset-detail/LSEND-19861019 (last visited November 21, 2017).   
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Breaux first campaigned for the U.S. Senate in 1986, sources linked Breaux’s opponent, 
Republican Congressman W. Henson Moore, III, to a group accused of purging names from 
voter rolls in rural areas.30 The purge’s target was African-American voters, but prominent 
members of the Long family were also purged and called attention to the issue.31 Although 
Louisiana has a tainted record of voter suppression attempts, modern Louisiana law could also 
serve as a model for implementing a viable alternative to restrictive voter ID laws.32 When a 
voter is unable to present identification to vote, then the voter could sign an affidavit instead.33  
Through an in-depth examination of published federal appellate court and U.S. Supreme 
Court cases, this thesis analyzes how courts, if at all, deal with voter identification laws under the 
First Amendment because literature indicates the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in how it 
has analyzed First Amendment challenges to voting laws. In addition, this thesis examines what 
First Amendment values, if any, courts are identifying relating to voting. In doing so, this thesis 
considers the historical backdrop of voter discrimination before states passed identification laws, 
especially for veterans, students, senior citizens, females, persons with disabilities, and 
minorities.  
  
                                                          
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 283. 
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 
The United States does have something very close to “universal suffrage,” where all adult 
citizens have the right to vote, with recent exceptions made for convicted felons.34 Voting 
discrimination, however, dates back to the American Revolution, arising out of fear of 
interference with local issues or overwhelmingly favoring one political party.35 African 
Americans and women historically struggled for the right to vote in the United States.  These two 
groups successfully secured the right to vote through Constitutional amendments XV in 1870 
and XIX in 1920. 
 While many still consider the Voting Rights Act of 1965 one of the most far-reaching 
pieces of civil rights legislation in U.S. history, its noble intent of enforcing the provisions of the 
Fifteenth Amendment and removing local barriers that prevented African Americans from voting 
was not without unintended consequences. This chapter reviews the Voting Rights Act, states’ 
uses of registration and voter identification laws, and then the Supreme Court’s approval of a 
strict, voter identification law in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board in 2008.  
The Voting Rights Act  
The South was a “cauldron of racial tension” in the 1950s.36 In Louisiana, for example, 
members of the White Citizens Council purged black registrants from voting lists for minor 
paperwork irregularities.37 Also, a 1960 state law allowed disenfranchisement for people of “bad 
character,” which included anyone participating in a sit-in.38 President Dwight Eisenhower, 
however, proceeded cautiously in his first term favoring a more limited federal government.39 
                                                          
34 Id. at xvi-xx.  
35 Id. at 9. 
36 Id. at 206. 
37 Id. at 207. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 208. 
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The 1956 murder of two Mississippi voting rights workers, however, spurred the President and 
Congress into action. 40 
As the first civil rights bill passed by Congress in 80 years, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 
was modest.41 The Act primarily promoted the voting rights agenda through the creation of the 
Commission on Civil Rights.42 The commission recommended the appointment of federal 
registrars to be dispatched to the South and given the authority to register voters.43 The 
commission also lent its power to call for broader national measures after concluding that the 
reliance on county-by-county litigation was “time consuming, expensive, and difficult” to bring 
an end to discriminatory voting practices.44 
Although then President John Kennedy owed his narrow electoral victory to the black 
vote, he lacked a strong popular mandate and had limited influence in Congress to advocate for a 
civil rights bill based on the commission’s recommendations.45 His successor, Lyndon Johnson, 
however, seized the moment of national unity after Kennedy’s assassination to obtain the civil 
rights bill’s passage as a tribute to the late president.46 As the first President to officially align 
himself with the Civil Rights Movement, Johnson noted in a joint session of Congress that “it is 
really all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And we shall 
overcome.”47  
                                                          
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 209. 
44 Id. at 209-10. 
45 Id. at 210. Kennedy beat Republican Richard Nixon by only 0.2 percent of the popular vote in 1960. Some alleged 
that fraud in Texas and Illinois cost Nixon the election. In response, Republicans organized an intricate antifraud 
campaign titled “Operation Eagle Eye.” Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 638 (2007). 
46 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 210.   
47 Id. at 211. 
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After successfully being elected as President in his own right in 1964, Johnson signed the 
historic Voting Rights Act of 1965 that contained critical elements demanded by activists and the 
Commission on Civil Rights.48 First, the Act immediately suspended literacy tests and good 
character voting requirements for five years.49 Second, the law gave the Attorney General 
authority to send federal examiners to the South to enroll voters.50 Also, to prevent future 
discriminatory requirements, section 5 of the act prohibited the state governments, 
predominantly in the South, from changing voting laws without first obtaining federal 
“preclearance.”51 Finally, the Act contained a congressional finding that poll taxes in state 
elections abridged the right to vote, and authorized the Justice Department to initiate litigation to 
challenge their constitutionality.52  
The Voting Rights Act was a milestone in American political history.53 Interestingly, the 
essence of the act enforced the Fifteenth Amendment, which had been the law for almost a 
century.54 Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006.55 Shortly 
after President George W. Bush signed the 2006 Voting Rights Act, a Texas utility district 
challenged section 5 in court after being denied a “bail out” from federal pre-clearance.56  
The utility district argued that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority with the 
pre-clearance requirement.57 Also, the district alleged that since racial discrimination was no 
longer a problem in modern society, the Voting Rights Act had achieved its objectives and pre-
                                                          
48 Id. at 210-11. 
49 Id. at 211. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 212. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 212-14. 
56 Id. at 215. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013). 
57 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 215. 
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clearance requirements had become burdensome.58 Ultimately, in 2013, the Supreme Court 
agreed with the utility district in Shelby County v. Holder and held section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 unconstitutional.59 In a divided 5-4 decision, the Court found that the formula 
impermissibly burdened the principles of federalism and was no longer responsive to the needs 
of society.60  
Voter Identification Laws  
 Although little evidence supports the problem of voter fraud, at best, Republicans pressed 
state legislatures to pass legislation that required all prospective voters to present government-
issued photo IDs in years leading up to the 2008 Presidential election.61 Existing identification 
requirements varied from state to state, and Republicans alleged that this was an invitation for 
voter fraud.62 Representatives claimed that government-issued IDs could prevent such fraudulent 
crimes.63 Also, new photo-ID laws would restore confidence in elections among “legitimate” 
voters who worried about the possibility of fraud, in the wake of the 2000 election debacle in 
Florida.64 Various states tightened ID requirements, including Arizona, Georgia, and Indiana.65  
 As of 2007, no empirical study at either the national or state level had measured the 
magnitude of voter fraud.66 Photo-identification advocates have relied on two categories of 
assertions in support of ID laws, including anecdotal examples of voter fraud and analogies to 
                                                          
58 Id. at 213-15.  
59 Id. at 215. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013). 
60 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 215. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013). 
61 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 283. 
62 Id. at 283-84. 
63 Id. at 284. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 285. 
66 Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 635 (2007). 
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other contexts that require photo identification.67 George Washington University Professor of 
Law Spencer Overton pointed out flaws in both arguments.68  
 First, anecdotal evidence has been heavily discounted in most fields because such 
evidence permits only a loose inference about matters a field is trying to study.69 In other words, 
anecdotes can mislead people to generalize rules based on examples that the anecdotes cannot 
teach.70 For example, Republicans cited anecdotal evidence of voter fraud to explain John 
Kerry’s massive Wisconsin win in the 2004 Presidential election.71 Of the nine allegations of 
“double-voting” that occurred in the state, a Republican-appointed U.S. attorney failed to indict 
any of these individuals on fraud charges.72 These examples are misleading because six of the 
cases involved clerical errors, and the other three involved individuals with similar names and 
different birth dates.73  
 Second, voting identification requirements have often been compared to presenting an 
identification to board an airplane, enter federal buildings, or buy alcohol.74 While analogies are 
common rhetorical tools, analogies have limitations.75 Overton pointed out that the relevant 
question should be whether voting resembles these other activities sufficiently to warrant 
identical treatment.76 In contrast to voting in elections, airline passengers do not cast votes that 
are totaled to assess the will of the entire airplane and to govern the journey.77 Similarly, liquor 
                                                          
67 Id. at 644. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 645. 
71 Id. at 645. Another anecdotal example used by Ronald Reagan for years, even after being informed of the true 
story, is the alleged “welfare queen” he used to discredit the welfare system. Reagan claimed she used 80 different 
names and a dozen Social Security cards to defraud the government of over $150,000. In reality, this woman used 
two aliases to recover $8,000. Id. at 645. 
72 Overton, supra note 66, at 646. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 650. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 651. 
77 Id. 
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stores lack incentives to exclude legitimate consumers, while some politicians benefit from 
reducing turnout of specific demographic populations likely to vote against them.78  
Best available data suggests an estimated six to eleven percent of voting-age Americans 
lack a state-issued photo ID, especially in states like Wisconsin, where seventy-eight percent of 
black men ages 18-24 lack a driver’s license.79 Without hard data, policymakers could 
misperceive the risk of voter fraud.80 Empirical data would also indicate whether such laws 
would disproportionately exclude certain groups, such as senior citizens, the poor, individuals 
with disabilities, and people of color. 81 
The Democratic Party resisted the new ID requirements that could disenfranchise as 
many as nineteen million potential voters who did not or could not possess a valid driver’s 
license or passport.82 Even if states created ways for individuals to obtain photo IDs, these paths 
would be inherently burdensome on the underprivileged and potentially cost prohibitive.83 In 
sum, new ID requirements potentially could lead to voter suppression that disproportionately 
impacted the young, elderly, poor, and African Americans, all of whom are more likely to vote 
Democratic.84 These laws were challenged in courts on various grounds, including violating state 
and federal constitutional provisions and the Voting Rights Act.85 Challengers argued that photo 
ID laws have placed an undue burden on the right to vote and have amounted to an extra-
                                                          
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 635. 
80 Id. at 652. 
81 Id. at 653. 
82 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 284. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 285. 
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constitutional franchise requirement.86 They also argued that voter ID laws disparately have 
prohibited low-income voters and voters of color from gaining access to the polls.87  
 In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a challenge to one of the strictest photo ID laws in 
the nation in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.88 The Indiana law at issue required 
voters to present an unexpired government-issued photo ID to vote, and provisional ballots 
would only count if the voter reported to the county clerk’s office within ten days of the election 
to present their required identification.89 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that few prospective voters would be burdened by the law, while acknowledging there 
had been no recent cited instances of voter impersonation.90  
A divided Supreme Court upheld the law as well.91 In his plurality opinion, Justice 
Stevens found the “risk of voter fraud” to be “real.”92 Reaching back to 1868 for examples, he 
wrote, “Flagrant examples of such fraud in other parts of the country have been documented 
throughout this Nation's history by respected historians and journalists.”93 Based on this 
evidence, Justice Stevens concluded there was no question regarding the importance of the 
state’s interest in preventing voter fraud.94 He asserted that “inconvenience” for voters lacking 
requisite identification was merely gathering documents and traveling to a motor vehicle office, 
which did not amount to an unduly burdensome requirement.95 Justice Scalia concurred in the 
                                                          
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).  
89 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 285.  
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195 n. 11. Stevens quoted in a footnote an infamous New York City election influenced by 
a political machine. “Big Tim” Sullivan, a New York state senator and U.S. congressman, insisted that the voters 
who were paid to vote multiple times have “whiskers,” which could be trimmed multiple times to have multiple 
appearances. Id.  
94 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 285.  
95 Id.  
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judgment only.96 Fearing a floodgate of litigation, he added that the Supreme Court should not 
get involved in local election law.97  
In his dissent, Justice Souter insisted that the burden Justice Stevens referred to would be 
“an unreasonable and irrelevant burden on voters who are poor and old.”98 Also, in the absence 
of no recent recorded voter impersonation cases, Souter indicated there is no demonstrable need 
for the strict law.99 In a separate dissent, while Justice Breyer approved of voter ID laws in 
general, he found Indiana’s to be unduly burdensome for low-income and elderly voters.100  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s election law docket was unusually diverse in 2008, including 
cases involving campaign finance, voter identification, the Voting Rights Act, and regulation of 
political parties.101 Overall, the Roberts Court’s treatment of theses cases showed more restraint 
than was exercised by their predecessors in their treatment of election laws, except for the 
Court’s intense review of campaign finance reforms.102 Although this docket gave the Court 
ample opportunity to shift the direction of election law jurisprudence toward promoting 
competition, the Court opinions stuck with traditional approaches, such as balancing state 
interests against the right to vote, and avoided asking whether the laws represented a means of 
entrenching incumbent parties.103  
After Crawford, Republicans across the nation began to press for passage of new photo-
identification laws modeled after Indiana’s.104 Exactly how many Indiana residents would be 
                                                          
96 Id. 
97 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, A., concurring).  
98 Id. at 237. 
99 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 286.  
100 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 237-39 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
101 Nathaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUP. 
CT. REV. 89, 89-90 (2008). 
102 Id. at 93. 
103 Id. at 94. 
104 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 286.  
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prevented from voting by the new ID law remained unclear, but within weeks of the decision, 
several senior-aged, Indiana nuns were prevented from voting in a primary because they lacked 
the required photo ID.105 Also, in the 2008 Presidential election, the most visible impact of the 
ID law was on out-of-state college students who tried to register to vote in cities where they were 
studying, but lacked requisite Indiana IDs.106 As in other periods of history, the combination of 
partisan interests, class apprehension, and a desire to win elections were all causes for narrowing 
the franchise.107 In addition, a deeply ingrained stereotypical belief existed that poor people, 
African Americans, and immigrants may be more vulnerable to persuasive politicians, interest 
groups, or employers who offered monetary incentives in exchange for members of these groups 
to vote a certain way.108  
A Constitutional Right to Vote 
 In 2001, Congressman Jesse Jackson proposed a Constitutional amendment for an 
“affirmative” right to vote for all citizens.109 Advocates for the change strongly believed that 
shoring up a Constitutional amendment could help prevent the legal chaos similar to that caused 
by Bush v. Gore in 2000 and even prevent future election hijacking if a state legislature decided 
to ignore the popular votes.110 The amendment, however, failed to gain support for various 
reasons.111 Some argued the change is not necessary because there is already an implicit right to 
vote in the Constitution.112 Others wanted to avoid a Constitutional amendment altogether to 
                                                          
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 286-87.  
108 Id. at 287. 
109 Id. at 291. 
110 Id. at 292. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Democratic candidate, Al Gore, filed a complaint contesting the 
certification of Florida’s state results in te 2000 Presidential election. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the manual 
recounts ordered by Florida Supreme Court, without objective standards for discerning a voter’s intent constituted 
an arbitrary treatment of voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.). 
111 Keyssar, supra note 16, at 292. 
112 Id. 
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dodge also addressing other initiatives, such as a ban on same-sex marriage.113 Finally, others 
feared this change could jeopardize renewal of the Voting Rights Act.114  
 In the 2000 Presidential election, law professor Jamin Raskin wrote that a majority of 
Americans learned that the U.S. Constitution has allowed state legislatures to disregard the 
people’s votes in Presidential elections.115 State legislatures have “plenary” power to “appoint, in 
such Manners as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.”116 Keyssar compared 
this underlying Constitutional fact to “a half-forgotten corpse” that “had suddenly been jarred 
loose from the river bottom and floated upward into view.”117  
Additional stark inequities exist in the current franchise structure, including about 
571,000 taxpaying, draftable U.S. citizens who live in the District of Columbia (D.C.), but lack 
any direct voting representation in Congress.118 Lacking Congressional representation is a double 
injustice to D.C. residents since Congress acts as both their national and local legislative body.119 
Similarly, about four million American citizens are living in the federal territories of Puerto 
Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.120 While Congress allows these 
citizens to vote for President, they lack representation in the Electoral College.121 Like D.C. 
residents, residents of the territories lack any direct representation in Congress other than a non-
voting delegate in the House of Representatives.122  
                                                          
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Jamin Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the US Constitution: Confronting America’s Structural 
Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559 (2004). 
116 U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 2.  
117 Raskin, supra note 115, at 561.  
118 Id. at 564.  
119 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 17. 
120 Raskin, supra note 115, at 565. 
121 Id. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3, cl. 2. 
122 Raskin, supra note 115, at 565. 
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Other unresolved issues to be answered by the drafters of the constitutional “right-to-
vote” amendment include whether to enfranchise convicted felons, and if so, when to do so, and 
lowering the voting age to 17 to allow millions of high school graduates to vote.123 Ironically, the 
United States was the first nation conceived as a democratic response against tyranny, while also 
being the only nation on earth that disenfranchises its capital city residents.124 In the absence of a 
voting amendment, the next section analyzes whether scholarship or Supreme Court opinions 
have recognized a constitutional right to vote contained within the First Amendment. 
State Constitutional Claims 
 Derfner and Hebert explained that often the level of judicial scrutiny in voting rights 
cases could be outcome determinative.125 The researchers cited a 2012 state appellate decision, 
Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, where it took two attempts and a directive from 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to strike down the state’s ID law as an unconstitutional burden 
on voters’ fundamental right to vote explicitly provided in the state’s constitution.126 On the first 
review, the Applewhite court did not apply strict scrutiny, but indicated it might have reached a 
different result if it had.127 After a full trial on remand, the court did apply strict scrutiny with the 
government required to show a compelling state interest for the law and that the narrow tailoring 
of the law to meet that interest, which the state did not, and the court struck down the law.128  
How Is Voting Protected under the First Amendment? 
  The U.S. Supreme Court has strictly scrutinized campaign spending to influence voters 
in elections by candidates, political parties, or even corporations as it would any other speech 
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regulations under the First Amendment.129 Scholars, however, have written that the Court began 
giving a “short shrift” to burdens on the right to vote and voter registration in 1972 when the 
U.S. Supreme Court addressed Dunn v. Blumstein.130 In Voting is Speech, Armand Derfner and J. 
Gerald Hebert, both civil rights attorneys, stated that voter identification laws pick and choose 
which types of identification are acceptable, and in doing so, pick and choose which types of 
voters are acceptable.131 Over time, courts have applied differing levels of judicial scrutiny when 
addressing voting rights as First Amendment rights.132  
Texas enacted the most illustrative law on this issue in 2011, and that voter identification 
law was subsequently mired in litigation in the Veasey v. Abbott line of cases.133 The law 
disenfranchised more than 600,000 voters unless they obtained a “qualifying ID,” which is more 
onerous and expensive than registering to vote.134 The law deemed concealed handgun permits 
and military IDs as acceptable, which are common forms of identification for white voters.135 
Meanwhile, student IDs and civilian government employee IDs were excluded and more 
commonly possessed by African American and Hispanic voters.136 In 2017, the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not hear an appeal of the case; Chief Justice John Roberts concluded the issues would 
be better suited for review at a later time.137  
                                                          
129 Derfner & Hebert, supra note 1, at 471. 
130 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)). 
131 Derfner& Hebert, supra note 1, at 474. 
132 Id. 
133  Id. Veasey v. Abbott, 265 F. Supp. 3d 684, 699 (2017) (holding that the voter identification law “violates Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act and the 14th and 15th Amendments”); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 215, 256 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(holding in part that the voter identification law “imposes significant and disparate burdens on the right to vote”). 
134 Derfner& Hebert, supra note 1, at 474. 
135 Id. TEX. ELEC. CODE. § 63.001(b)(1) (West 2017) (requiring one form of photo ID). 
136 Derfner& Hebert, supra note 1, at 474. Various legislatures also passed laws limiting early voting and same-day 
registration, which usually help enhance minority voter turnout. Id.  
137 Abbott v. Veasey, 580 U. S. ____, *2 (2017). 
17 
 
Dating back to the 1960s, laws that placed “severe” restrictions, such as property 
ownership, literacy tests, or poll taxes, on the right to vote, were subject to strict scrutiny by the 
Court.138 For instance, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections involved a poll tax that directly 
restricted some citizens’ right to vote.139 In that 1966 opinion, the Supreme Court identified the 
right to vote as a “fundamental right” and struck down the law under a strict scrutiny analysis.140 
The burden of proof under strict scrutiny falls on the government to show a compelling state 
interest and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.141 Often under strict 
scrutiny, when the government is unable to show a compelling interest, so the Court overturns 
the restriction.142  
The arrival of four new justices turned voting rights cases in a different direction in a 
series of cases starting in 1973.143 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the 
majority opinion indicated it has a long history of providing “zealous protection” against 
government interference with “the individual’s rights to speak and vote” and addressed a nexus 
between education and voting rights when addressing the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause.144  “Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority 
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice,”145 
according to the Court. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall wrote, however, that such 
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important interests underlie the right to vote that the court previously applied strict scrutiny 
analysis to discriminatory state treatment regarding voting.146 Derfner and Hebert explained this 
case as indicating the Constitution only protects the right “to participate in . . . elections on an 
equal basis with other qualified voters.”147 
In 1974, in Storer v. Brown, the Court held, “As a practical matter, there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections to ensure they are fair and orderly.”148 The Court indicated 
restrictions would be upheld so long as not “invidious, discriminatory, or excessively 
burdensome.”149  Thus, courts have allowed state governments to put “reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions” on voting.150 These restrictions enjoy a legal presumption of 
validity under “rational basis” scrutiny, and the burden of proof falls upon the challenging 
plaintiff to show the restriction is not “sufficiently justified by an important state interest.”151 
Justice William Brennan, however, in his dissenting opinion, stated, “The right to vote derives 
from the right of association that is at the core of the First Amendment,” and thus, courts should 
subject voting regulations to strict scrutiny.152  
 Then, in 1983, the Supreme Court seemed to swing back toward closer scrutiny of voting 
regulations.153 In Anderson v. Celebrezze, described as a freedom of association case, the 
Supreme Court held that a voter’s interests under the First Amendment required the Court to 
strike down a restrictive filing deadline in Ohio for independent candidates.154 Although the 
Court did not articulate a particular level of scrutiny, the decision suggests some degree of 
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intermediate scrutiny.155 Anderson had a minimal practical effect on jurisprudence because the 
Court continued to engage in the “rational basis”-like scrutiny balancing burdens on voting rights 
against the great deference given to the state’s interest in ensuring a fair and orderly election.156 
Although Anderson had little impact on the level of scrutiny courts applied, the case provided the 
analytical framework for the Burdick balancing test that the Court used to justify Hawaii’s ban 
on write-in candidates in 1992.157 
Subsequently, in Norman v. Reed, the Supreme Court in 1992 struck down some ballot 
access requirements for political parties and upheld others.158 Again, the Court stated these 
restrictions affected the First Amendment right of association for citizens to express their 
political preference through voting, and these limits had to be narrowly drawn to advance a 
compelling state interest, implying strict scrutiny.159 The Court, however, added the condition 
“severe” to its criteria for when to apply strict scrutiny in cases alleging voting as a right of 
association.160 Examples of “severe” restriction include property ownership and literacy tests.161 
Ominous warning signs against full First Amendment protections for voting were present 
as far back as 1986.162 In Munro v. Socialist Workers, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington 
statute that required minority party candidates to receive at least one percent of all votes cast in 
the primary election before the state would place the candidate’s name on the general election 
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ballot.163 First, the Court explained that states have a right to require candidates to make a 
preliminary showing of substantial support before placing them on the ballot and are not required 
to prove evidence of voter confusion from ballot overcrowding to do so.164 On balance, the Court 
held the First Amendment burdens did not outweigh the state’s interest in restricting access to 
the general election ballot.165 The Court found the statute promoted voters’ freedom of 
association because it required citizens to “channel their expressive activity” in a primary 
campaign, before the general.166    
In 1992, five months after Norman, the Court backtracked on the prior line of cases 
promoting robust First Amendment protections for voting rights and signaled the Court would 
tolerate non-severe restrictions, such as Hawaii’s ban on “write-in” candidates.167  Initially, in 
Burdick v. Takushi, the district court concluded that the ban on write-in voting violated 
petitioner's First Amendment right of expression and entered a preliminary injunction ordering 
Hawaii to allow casting and tallying write-in votes.168  
In a similar case, the southern district court of Indiana struck down the state’s ban on 
write in candidates in Paul v. Indiana.169 Here, the plaintiff challenged the law as infringing on 
their free expression and association rights of both voters and potential candidates.170 The court 
noted in its analysis that it “place[d] more importance on a voter’s right to vote for the candidate 
of his choice than on a candidate’s right to run for office.”171 The district courts in both Paul and 
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Burdick took a step, in the context of write-in voting, where they refined the right to vote as an 
element of political expression.172 Other cases also view write-in voting as a constitutionally 
protected protest. In Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative Board of Election Laws, the Fourth 
Circuit appellate court reasoned that write-ins for fictional or non-existent characters, such as 
“Donald Duck,” do not lose constitutional protection because “the right to vote for the candidate 
of one’s choice includes that right to say that no candidate is acceptable.”173 
As a leading First Amendment scholar, Alexander Meiklejohn, explained, “[t]he freedom 
that the First Amendment protects is…the presence of self-government.”174 Citizens vote to elect 
representatives after selecting certain ideas through political expression.175 As the Burdick 
district court wrote, “Political participation should not be limited to those who adhere to the 
ideals and goals of the major political parties.”176 Thus, the district courts incorporated the 
theoretical interdependence between voting and political expression into jurisprudence.177  
On the other hand, both Burdick and Paul suggest the possibility that certain state 
interests may outweigh the unrestricted right to write-in.178 For instance, the state has a write to 
ensure that victorious write-in candidates are legally qualified to hold their elected office.179 
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit court of appeals in Burdick held that although 
prohibiting write-in votes “places some restrictions” on citizens’ rights of expression, the burden 
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is justified given Hawaii’s ease of access to ballots, providing sufficient alternatives to voters to 
express their political beliefs, and the state’s broad power and interest in regulating elections.180  
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that Hawaii’s ban was sufficiently justified.  Regarding 
the right of association, the Court stated, “Each provision of a code, ‘whether it governs the 
registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting 
process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual's right to vote and his right 
to associate with others for political ends.’”181 Instead, the Court asserted, “the mere fact that a 
State's system ‘creates barriers ... tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might 
choose ... does not of itself compel close scrutiny.’”182  The Court elaborated on the state’s 
interest in preventing voter confusion and fraud at the polls as a legitimate one and lowered the 
level of review to something akin to rational basis review with the court presuming the validity 
of the state law and requiring the challenger prove an unconstitutional burden on voting rights.183 
Interestingly, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissent agrees with the majority that the right of 
expression is not implicated in this case because “the purpose of casting, counting, and recording 
votes is to elect public officials, not to serve as a general forum for political expression.”184 
All Supreme Court justices in Burdick agreed that voting only determines office holders, 
and does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas.185 The Fourth Circuit’s holding that a write-
in vote can be an expression of dissent in Dixon now lacked constitutional support.186 The 
Burdick court also minimized the potential burden of Hawaii’ ban of write-in candidates, even if 
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voting were speech, when the majority identified the ban as only burdening voters who identify 
their candidate late in the election process.187 The dissent noted that this reasoning, however, 
ignores the significance of late breaking information upon the electorate.188 Another point of 
contention lies in the majority failing to mention the dominance of the Democratic Party in 
Hawaii.189 The dissent points out that any party who uses an election law to maintain the status 
quo provides strong evidence of the unconstitutionality of those laws.190  
Derfner and Hebert concluded that voting rights should be given full First Amendment 
protection and offered a viable alternative model for subjecting restrictive voter ID laws to strict 
scrutiny.191 The Supreme Court has never explicitly said voting should not receive the same First 
Amendment protections as speech.192 Analogous case law, however, supports full First 
Amendment protection for the right to vote as giving “opportunities for all voters to express their 
own political preferences.”193 
Other expressive functions implicated by voting are strong.194 First, a vote is expressive 
regardless of whether the voter even casts a ballot.195 Unlike many other countries, the United 
States does not require citizens to vote.196 The decision not to vote may express protest, in itself, 
to the unresponsiveness of government.197 Second, ignoring the expressive nature of voting 
contradicts the robust protections granted to monetary expression in politics.198  
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In its 1976 seminal case, Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held “money is speech [i]n 
a republic where people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices 
among candidates for office is essential.”199 Voters then take the information from the 
marketplace of ideas and make decisions about whose views to adopt.200 The Court stated in a 
footnote, the “central purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses was to assure a society in 
which…public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in such a 
society can a healthy representative democracy flourish”.201  
The footnote cites the 1964 case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, where Sullivan was an 
elected commissioner of the Montgomery, Alabama, police department.202 The Court stated that 
First Amendment speech does not lose constitutional protection to which it would otherwise be 
entitled because it appears in the form of a paid advertisement.203  
When asserting the advertisement served as constitutionally-protected expression, this 
Court cited NAACP v. Button, which stated the various political functions of the advertisement, 
including “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed 
abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives 
are matters of the highest public interest and concern.”204  The Court explained, “That erroneous 
                                                          
199 Id. (citing 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976)).  
200 Derfner & Hebert, supra note 1, at 489. 
201 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976). 
202 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). Sullivan sued the New York Times claiming the 
paper published libelous statements in an advertisement, some of which were false, about police action during a civil 
rights demonstration. Id.  The trial judge instructed the jury that these statements were “libelous per se” without 
requiring Sullivan to prove “actual malice,” or show that statements were published with knowledge of their falsity 
or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 262. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the trial judge erroneously instructed 
the jury to presume malice under the First and Fourteen Amendments. Id. at 265. The Court prevented awarding 
damages to public officials for falsehoods relating to official conduct of public officials unless “actual malice” is 
proven. Id. 
203 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265-66. 
204 Id. at 266.  
25 
 
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression 
are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need…to survive.’”205   
The Court addressed both First Amendment freedom of association and expression in 
NAACP v. Button.206 The First Amendment protects abstract discussion and vigorous advocacy 
to the lawful end of opposing government intrusion of individual rights.207  
In sum, Buckley held that campaign spending is a form of protected political speech so a 
“healthy representative democracy can flourish.”208 Sullivan protected an advertisement as 
political expression that “communicated information” and “expressed opinion.”209 Button held 
abstract discussion and vigorous advocacy to be protected forms of expression.210 All of these 
activities ultimately attempt to influence and may culminate in the expression of one’s political 
preference via the ballot box.211 Thus, Derfner and Hebert concluded that the Court should 
reverse Burdick’s “rational basis”-like standard for analyzing voting regulations and place the 
right to vote at the “top of the pantheon” of protected First Amendment rights.212 
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Our modern-day conception of free expression includes the right to form and hold beliefs 
and opinions on any subject and to communicate those ideas using any medium.213 At the same 
time, controversial legal issues arise when courts reconcile free expression rights with other 
individual and societal interests.214 An effective system of free expression mandates a realistic 
administrative structure.215 Legal theorist and architect of civil liberties law, Thomas Emerson, 
examines the legal foundations upon which free expression rests in the United States.216  
This chapter reviews the theoretical foundation of the freedom of expression, which 
encompasses both speech and press rights in the First Amendment, as developed by Thomas 
Emerson. Then, the focus shifts toward individual and social values of free expression, including 
the social foundation of self-governance explicated by Alexander Meiklejohn. Finally, some 
scholars suggest that voter ID laws may be more closely scrutinized by courts if challenged 
under explicit provisions of state constitutions that grant voters a fundamental right to vote.  
 Our system of free expression rests upon four major values.217 While the validity of the 
values has never been proven or disproven, our society acts upon the faith that they hold true.218 
First, free expression is essential to assure individual self-fulfillment.219 Second, the system 
ensures knowledge advancement and the discovery of truth.220  
More aligned with the purpose of this thesis, the third value states that freedom of 
expression allows participation in political decision-making, participation for all members of 
                                                          
213 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3 (Vintage Books, 1970). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 4.  
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 6. 
218 Id. at 7.  
219 Id. at 6. 
220 Id. 
27 
 
society.221 The Declaration of Independence, which states governments “derive their just powers 
from the consent of the governed,” contains the roots of this premise.222 The final value is that 
the system of free expression allows for a more adaptable and stable community.223 The 
principles of the system must constantly be reshaped to meet new social conditions or threats to 
existence.224 Any suppression of discussion makes rational judgment impossible and substitutes 
force for reason.225  
In 1970, Emerson wrote that the Supreme Court had not developed any comprehensive 
theory of what the Constitution guarantees regarding the meaning of free expression or how the 
lower courts should apply free expression theory in cases.226 Often, the Court avoids First 
Amendment issues entirely by invoking other doctrines, such as vagueness or overbreadth.227 At 
other times, the commonly used a balancing test often producing inconsistent results.228  
In his 1963 article, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, Emerson 
developed a more comprehensive First Amendment theory.229 He stated that achieving a system 
of free expression could only be possible if expression received full First Amendment 
protection.230 That means expression must be protected against all government curtailment even 
when in conflict with other social interests.231 As opposed to how the Court usually develops 
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First Amendment doctrine by balancing expression against other social values, Emerson 
explained that the judiciary should instead define key terms, like expression, abridge, and law.232  
Emerson stated that “abridge” usually means when the government limits expression to 
advance other interests.233 The definition, however, becomes obscure when the government 
attempts to regulate the internal operations of the system of expression, such as voter 
identification laws.234 Finally, the context of “law” arises largely within the rights of expression 
in private associations.235  
Freedom of Speech and Self-Governance 
Philosopher and free-speech advocate, Alexander Meiklejohn acknowledged that 
Americans view ourselves as politically free.236 He said, “If men are to be governed, then the 
governing must be done, not by others, but by themselves.”237 Then, Meiklejohn admits that the 
American political program of self-government is a work in progress.238 
The foundation of every self-governing plan is an agreement between all citizens that all 
matters of public policy shall be decided by “corporate actions,” or majority rule.239 Such 
decisions shall be equally binding on citizens, whether they agreed or not, and if need be, the 
decisions shall, by legal procedure, be enforced by the government upon anyone who refuses to 
conform to these decisions.240 Since both systems require some form of obedience, Meiklejohn 
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explained that government by “consent” means people can talk about their government, not 
always in terms it favors, regarding their rights and their ability to reason.241   
 The First Amendment does not necessarily forbid abridging all forms of speech, such as 
libelous assertions, slander, or incitement.242 Here, the interests of promoting the general welfare 
outweigh the speaker’s individual rights.243  
 When self-governing men demand free speech, they are not saying that every individual 
has the right to speak whenever on whatever topic.244 The ultimate issue is not the words of the 
speaker.245 The First Amendment protects the minds of the hearers to inform them of all content 
on a public issue.246 “It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which 
the First Amendment is directed,” said Meiklejohn.247  
 The distinction between public and private interests becomes clearer when comparing the 
First Amendment to the Fifth Amendment text, “No person shall be…deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”248 The Supreme Court has defined “liberty” to include 
“liberty of speech.”249 The difference in the amendments is that the Fifth Amendment appears to 
deal with a class of utterances which the legislature may legitimately address, such as libel or 
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slander, which are private rights.250 In contrast, the First Amendment deals with public utterances 
which the legislature may never address even with due process.251  
 Under the Constitution, citizens agreed to be self-governed by corporate actions and 
defined “just powers” of the government.252 In the compact, government power does not mean 
that someone else has power over citizens.253 Instead, the citizens select who is given governing 
authority through voting.254 
 In 1955, Meiklejohn testified before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights and addressed voting rights.255 Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the 
people as “electors” to choose their representatives.256 Meiklejohn said, “We the people are not 
only the supreme agency. We are also, politically, an active electorate—a Fourth, or perhaps 
better, a First Branch which, through its reserved powers, governs at the polls.”257 It follows that 
under the Constitution, Americans are politically free only insofar as voting is free.258 
 When citizens vote, they not only choose among candidates, but also among the issues.259 
As a self-governing body, the people have two demands to promote the general welfare.260 First, 
judgment of public issues must be free and independent.261 Second, citizens must be equally free 
and independent in expressing their choice at the polls.262 Meiklejohn wrote, “Censorship over 
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our thinking, duress over our voting; are alike forbidden by the First Amendment.”263 
Accordingly, any person or governing body that practices censorship or duress stands in 
“contempt” of the sovereign people of the United States.264 
Citizens exercise multiple expressive processes through voting in a self-governing 
system.265 First, people make up their minds by reading printed records of thoughts and beliefs of 
others.266 People express thoughts through active associations in private and public discussion.267 
Finally, the voter must be allowed on Election Day to express their choice using a ballot.268  
Even though voting is typically done in secret or anonymously, this practice is not 
universal.269 For example, Iowa uses public caucuses to vote in presidential primary elections.270 
Regardless, the Supreme Court has consistently given strong protection to anonymous speech in 
campaign finance cases.271 While individuals may cast their ballot anonymously, citizens first 
declare their choice to participate in the democratic process in front of their community and 
create a public record of their choice.272 States then publish the aggregated votes and convey the 
electorate’s opinions of various candidates, ballot propositions, recalls, or referendums.273 
Free Expression Values 
 Free expression values fall into two distinct models.274 The liberty model focuses on 
values of the individual, while the audience model focuses primarily on societal values.275 First, 
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the liberty model includes one’s right to communicate and publish information, along with other 
values, such as autonomy, self-fulfillment, and self-realization.276 The liberty model also allows 
individuals to participate in democracy and search for the truth.277 The audience model, however, 
focuses on society’s right’s to receive information.278 Corresponding audience values include: 
enabling self-governance, checking government, creating a marketplace of ideas, maintaining a 
balance between social stability and change, and fostering toleration.279 
 The first individual value, individual autonomy and democracy, is rooted in Emerson’s 
four key values of freedom of expression as articulated in The System of Freedom of 
Expression.280 Emerson explained that one’s ability to express ideas, without fear of censorship, 
is essential to developing personal dignity and affirming one’s sense of personal autonomy.281 He 
elaborated that individuals must also be able to discover truth through discussion and debate, 
which is essential to the ultimate good of society.282 Finally, Emerson describes a necessary part 
of free expression as allowing one to assert opinions as both autonomous individuals and as 
members of society.283  
Individual autonomy and self-realization is the second individual value, which was first 
articulated by leading First Amendment scholar, C. Edwin Baker in his article, “Scope of the 
First Amendment Freedom of Speech.”284 Baker advocated for a broad “liberty model” that 
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required the community to respect “the dignity and equal worth” of individual members.285 
Under Baker’s model, the speakers would have the freedom to choose the content of their speech 
that fosters self-realization without interfering with the same legitimate claim of others.286 The 
government could only limit speech to non-violent, non-coercive activities to avoid causing harm 
to other individuals.287 
 Autonomy and self-realization is another individual value.288 Two of the early theorists 
include John Milton and John Stuart Mill.289 In 1644, English poet, John Milton, published 
Areopagatica, wherein he laid a foundational model for personal liberty and freedom from 
censorship.290 Two centuries later, British philosopher and political economist, John Stuart Mill, 
published On Liberty in 1859.291 Mill argued that government suppression, either upon 
individuals or the press, undermined human development.292 Emphasizing individual liberty, 
Mill referred to expression as linked to the “sphere of life in which ‘society…has, if any, only an 
indirect interest.’”293 This individual sphere contains four components: 1) “the inward domain of 
consciousness,” 2) “liberty of conscience,” 3) “liberty of thought and feeling,” and 4) “absolute 
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects.”294   
In contrast, the audience model, which may also be considered a societal model, focuses 
solely on society’s right’s to receive information or their right to know.295 These societal values 
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include: enabling self-governance, providing a check on government, creating a marketplace of 
ideas, maintaining a balance between social stability and change, and fostering toleration.296  
 The first societal value is audience and self-governance, which is rooted in Meiklejohn’s 
theory of free speech detailed in his 1948 book, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government.297 As opposed to the liberty model theorists, Meiklejohn provides narrower 
protection for free expression.298 As previously discussed, he proposed a constitutional 
dichotomy wherein the First Amendment absolutely protects speech on matters of governing 
importance, referred to as public speech.299 Other types of speech, or private speech, fell under 
the more limited protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.300  
 Audiences and democracy is the second societal value advocated by prominent First 
Amendment theorist, Harry Kalven, Jr., following New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964.301 As 
discussed, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the New York Times when the paper published 
allegedly libelous statements in an advertisement, some of which were false and others were true, 
about police action during a civil rights demonstration.302 Here, Kalven explained that if the 
Court allowed sanctioning speech for government criticism, then the ruling may dissuade other 
speakers from making true, critical statements about the government.303  
 Another societal value that addresses freedom of expression and democracy focuses First 
Amendment protections on the public’s “right to know.”304 The leading theorist on this value, 
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Emerson proposed, in 1976, that the “right to know” is an “integral part” of a well-functioning 
system of free expression with two related features.305 First, the public has the right to read, to 
listen, to see, and to receive communications.306 The public also possesses the corollary right to 
obtain information as a basis for transmitting ideas or facts to others.307 Combined these rights 
form the reverse of one’s right to communicate and serves the crucial role of ensuring the 
electorate remains informed.308 Emerson suggested that this value could be of the greatest value 
to society when exercised by the public to obtain information from government actors.309  
 The next audience-based value is the marketplace of ideas.310 Developed by Supreme 
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his 1919 dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 
when the majority upheld the conviction a group of self-proclaimed “revolutionists” charged 
with espionage for printing leaflets to resist U.S. war efforts.311 A major First Amendment 
scholar, Rodney Smolla, suggested the marketplace value emphasizes the societal component of 
the public’s search for the truth.312 Some scholars, however, have indicated the marketplace 
theory has fundamentally flawed assumptions.313 For example, Baker criticized the theory for 
failing in an unrestricted economic society where individuals lack equal access to media, or 
where media monopolies could limit the diversity of viewpoints available in media.314  
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 Maintaining social stability while also facilitating change is another societal value, which 
presumes a free flow of information benefits society by acting as a safety valve that enriches 
discussion and debate.315 When the safety value is off, secrecy and violence could result.316  
 Relatedly, the final societal value is toleration, which was developed by Professor Lee C. 
Bollinger, a First Amendment legal scholar.317 Bollinger suggested that a system of free 
expression is one wherein people share and receive diverse opinions.318 He wrote, “Through 
toleration…we create the community.”319 Bollinger proposed that listening to extreme 
viewpoints that may contradict one’s beliefs may help individuals in search of truth.320  
 In sum, the audience-based values prioritize the benefits of free expression to society.321 
On the other hand, liberty-based values prioritize the benefits of free expression for individual 
communicators.322 Courts may draw distinctions amongst values when considering how much 
First Amendment protections to give certain acts.323 For example, Meiklejohn’s theory would 
only provide absolute First Amendment protection to speech that facilitates self-governance, or 
societal good.324  
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
RQ 1: How do courts, if at all, analyze voter identification law challenges as infringing on First 
Amendment freedom of expression?  
 
RQ 2: What individual or societal expression values, if any, do courts invoke when addressing 
challenges to voter identification laws?  
 
RQ 3: How do courts’ analysis differ, if at all, for voter identification challenges under state 
constitutional provisions explicitly providing for a fundament right to vote?  
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CHAPTER 5. METHODS 
This study reviews a categorical overview of state voter ID law that the National Council 
of State Legislatures identified as being in effect in 2018 and then reviews how courts have 
analyzed voter ID laws under the First Amendment.325 Since the U.S. Supreme Court published 
its most relevant opinion in 2008 in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, this thesis 
focuses on court rulings published since 2008.  
 According to a National Council of State Legislatures study, sixteen states do not require 
voters to present any documentation to vote.326 The remaining thirty-four states require some 
form of identification before voting.327 The author of this thesis identified any major trends in the 
laws identified in the Council’s study.   
 The Council further divides the 34 states based upon whether the states require a voter 
lacking an ID to take additional steps for their provisional ballot to count or not, known as strict 
and non-strict states respectively.328 The author of this thesis broke down the various actions 
required by voters and ranked each state law from least to most onerous on voters. The author 
classified the alternative means states use to verify a voter’s identity and ranked each state from 
least to most onerous on voters. Then, the author identified any clusters of states that imposed the 
same or similar burdens on voters to cast a provisional ballot.   
This study attempted a systematic review of post-Crawford state high court, U.S. Court 
of Appeals, and U.S. district court rulings between May 2008 and May 2018 to determine 
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whether and how courts address free expression theory by reading courts opinions to determine if 
any First Amendment arguments were raised.329 In addition, the analysis examined whether and 
how plaintiffs or courts addressed free expression values in explaining why voting implicated 
First Amendment protection.330 Finally, the analysis concluded with examining voter ID 
challenges under various state constitutions to examine whether the level of judicial scrutiny or 
analytical framework used by the courts differed.331  
 The case analysis focused on state high courts’ rulings and U.S. Court of Appeals’ rulings 
because state high courts have binding authority over lower state courts within their respective 
states.332 The author also reviewed the federal district court rulings reviewed by these higher 
courts, some even predating Crawford, for a more detailed explication of the evidence presented 
in the case and to gain context on how Crawford changed the analysis of voter ID cases.333 
 The author identified cases by searching the online versions of Westlaw, which is a 
leading legal database used by legal scholars.334 Search criteria limitations included voter 
identification cases reported after April 28, 2008, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 
Crawford.335  
The searches were performed using Boolean keyword searches, using “Boolean logic,” or 
a mathematical formula that uses specific words and operators to narrow searches.”336 Search 
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one illustrates the sample size of cases available on Westlaw classified as “voter identification,” 
and Search two limits the results further to voter identification cases with First Amendment 
claims. The keyword searches used by this author in the database consisted of:   
Search 1 = ("voter identification" OR "voter ID") % contribution = 305 cases 
Search 2 = ("freedom #of expression" OR "freedom #of speech" OR "free speech") 
AND ("First Amendment") AND ("voter identification" OR "voter ID") % 
contribution = 33 cases 
  
The “%” represents “but not” in Boolean logic. This search criterion was added to the search 
logic to exclude cases concerning campaign contributions. The final search yielded thirty-three 
cases with First Amendment claims out of the entire sample of three hundred and five voter ID 
cases, which preliminarily indicates that First Amendments claims were addressed in almost 
eleven percent of voter identification appellate court cases. After reviewing all thirty-three cases 
with First Amendment claims, the author eliminated twenty-eight election law cases that did not 
challenge voter ID laws.337  
Of the five cases remaining, Veasey v. Perry appeared twice in the search results at two 
different stages in the posture of the case, and the author analyzed these two results together.338 
Next, ACLU of New Mexico v. Santillanes yielded an appellate court decision reversing the lower 
court opinion that came down right after Crawford.339 The author also reviewed the district court 
ruling, even though it predates Crawford, for context on how Crawford changed the analysis of 
voter ID cases.340 Since scholarship cited for this study also addressed a state constitutional 
                                                          
337 Of the 28 eliminated cases, eight dealt with electioneering and get-out-the-vote efforts, fourteen dealt with ballot 
access for candidates or organizations collecting early ballots, and three dealt with local property tax elections to 
raise revenues for public schools. The final three cases dealt with miscellaneous topics, including the First 
Amendment right to petition government, separation of powers, and compelled disclosure of criminal suspects’ 
emails in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
338 Veasey v. Perry, 29 F.Supp.3d 896 (S.D. Texas 2014) and Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014).  
339 The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008). 
340 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007). 
41 
 
challenge in Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, that opinion was also analyzed.341 
Since Applewhite addressed a state constitutional challenge, two recent 2018 decisions 
challenging Alabama and Oklahoma’s voter ID laws under their respective state constitutions 
also were reviewed.342 Therefore, the sample for the study is seven cases or N=7. The thesis also 
examined relative cases identified in literature and opinions reviewed for the thesis.343  
The author used traditional textual analysis to assess whether and how courts discussed 
First Amendment theory and values when explaining rationales for holdings, concurrences, or 
dissents.344 Opinions categories included: 1) discussing free expression theory and values; 2) 
discussing free expression theory and not values; 3) discussing free expression values and not 
theory; 4) not discussing free expression.345 When a court addressed free expression values, these 
values were further divided into individual or social values as found in the literature.346  
Regarding free expression theory, this study first searches for references to any of 
Emerson’s four values of free expression: 1) assure individual self-fulfillment, 2) advance 
knowledge and the discovery of truth, 3) promote political decision-making for all members of 
society, and 4) allow for a more adaptable and stable community.347 Next, since Meiklejohn 
specifically addressed voting as speech in his 1955 testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,348 this study addresses Meiklejohn’s assertion that the 
First Amendment provides absolute protection to ideas and beliefs regarding matters of public 
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governance.349 In contrast, he asserted the complementary Fifth Amendment provides only 
qualified due process protections for private speech, such as libel or slander.350 This study also 
assesses whether opinions address Meiklejohn’s identification of multiple expressive processes 
exercised through voting, such as reading printed information and participating in public and 
private discussions, or their expression of choice using a ballot.351  
When identifying individual and societal free expression values, the study uses the 
scholar’s explications of those values.352 The individual values include autonomy, self-
fulfillment, self-realization, the discovery of truth, and participation in political decision-
making.353 The societal values are Meiklejohn’s effective self-governance, government checking, 
the marketplace of ideas, balance between social stability and change, and toleration.354  
 Finally, this study has several limitations.355 First, the sample restrictions were published 
cases reported by Westlaw, as identified by using search tools and identified in relevant 
literature.356 It is possible that some relevant cases were not included in the database or not 
associated with search mechanisms used for the service or mentioned in literature.357 Also, 
limiting state cases to those decided by state high courts and federal cases to district court 
opinions reviewed by appellate courts may result in missing some significant discussions by 
lower state courts and unappealed federal court decision.358  
                                                          
349 Meiklejohn, supra note 236, at 17-19. 
350 Coyle, supra note 274, at 37-39. 
351 Meiklejohn, supra note 255, at 522. 
352 Coyle, supra note 274, at 53. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. 
355 Coyle, supra note 274, at 59. 
356 Id. 
357 Id. 
358 Id. 
43 
 
 Second, textual analysis introduces subjectivity into this study.359 Even though this study 
explains free expression theory and values in the preceding pages, deciding which language fits 
in each category requires interpretation and judgment.360 It is possible that another person who 
reads these cases would place language in other categories.361 Recognizing this limit, the author 
carefully read a sample of cases and applied the value explications to each one in an attempt to 
minimize challenges to the consistent application of the values.362 
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CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS 
This chapter first reviews state voter identification laws in effect in 2018.363 Next, this 
chapter reviews the holdings and rationales of court opinions addressing voter ID laws 
challenged under state or federal constitutional law after the Supreme Court gave its nod of 
approval to Indiana’s voter identification laws in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.364  
Sixteen states, including New Mexico and Pennsylvania, do not require any 
documentation to vote.365 In the case analysis that follows, ACLU of New Mexico v. Santillanes 
did not involve a dispute over a statewide New Mexico ID law.366 Instead, the issue of the case 
involved an ID requirement for voting in local Albuquerque elections.367  
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, had a statewide photo ID law in effect in 2012, which 
was struck down by a state commonwealth court in Applewhite v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania as violating the state’s constitutionally-provided fundmental right to vote.368 As 
noted in the literature, on the first review, the commonwealth court did not apply strict scrutiny 
and upheld the law.369 After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case back to the 
lower court, the court applied strict scrutiny and found the state had not adequately proven a 
compelling state interest for the ID law or the narrow tailoring to meet that interest, so the law 
struck down.370 Since the 2012 Applewhite decision, Pennsylvania requires no documentation to 
cast a ballot.371  
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 Thirty-four states require some form of identification to vote.372 Based on the laws in 
effect in 2018, 17 states request some form of photo ID, such as a driver’s license, state-issued 
ID card, military ID, or tribal ID.373 The other 17 states accept non-photo IDs, such as bank 
statements or utility bills with the voter’s name and address.374  
The National Council of State Legislatures categorized state voter ID laws in two 
ways.375 First, the council sorted laws by whether the state requires a photo ID or accepts a non-
photo ID to vote.376 Second, the council divided the laws as “strict” or “non-strict” based on 
subsequent actions required by voters to cast a ballot when voters lack a required ID. 377 Table 1 
illustrates the classification of laws of all 34 states with voter ID laws in effects in 2018. 
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Table 1. NCSL Classification of 34 States with Voter ID Laws in Effect in 2018 
 Photo ID Required Non-Photo ID Accepted 
Strict  
(subsequent trips required for the 
provisional ballot to count) 
Georgia 
Indiana 
Kansas 
Mississippi 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
Wisconsin378 
Arizona 
North Dakota 
Ohio379 
Non-Strict 
(no subsequent trips required for the 
provisional ballot to count) 
Arkansas 
Alabama 
Florida 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Louisiana 
Michigan 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Texas380 
Alaska 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Iowa 
Kentucky 
Missouri 
Montana 
New Hampshire 
Oklahoma 
South Carolina 
Utah 
Washington 
West Virginia381 
Then, the National Council of State Legislatures has further subdivided these 34 state 
laws based upon whether the law requires subsequent steps by the voter who does not possess the 
requisite identification.382 The council labeled these state requirements as either “strict” or “non-
strict.”383 In strict states, voters lacking an accepted ID may cast a provisional ballot but must 
                                                          
378 GA. CODE §21-2-417 (2010); IND. CODE §3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2 and 3-11-8-25.1 (2014); KAN. STAT. §25-2908, 
25-1122, 25-3002, and 8-1324(g)(2) (2012); MISS. CODE §23-15-563 (2013); TENN. CODE §2-7-112(c) (2010); VA. 
CODE §24.2-643(b) (2016); WIS. STAT. §5.02(6m) and 6.79(2)(a) (2014). 
379 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §16-579(A) (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE §16.1-05-07 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE §3503.16(B)(1)(a) 
and 3505.18(A)(1) (2006). 
380 ARK.  CONST. amend. 51, § 13. ARK. CODE § 7-1-101,201, 305, 308, 324, 409, and 412 (2015); ALA. CODE §17-9-
30 (2013); FLA. STAT. §101.043 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. §11-136 (2014); IDAHO CODE §34-1106(2), 1113, and 
1114 (2017); LA. REV. STAT. §18:562 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS §168.523 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS §17-19-24.2 
(2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §12-18-6.1 and 6.2 (2014); TEX. ELEC. CODE §63.001 et seq. (2017). 
381 ALASKA STAT. §15.15.225 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §1-1-104(19.5) and 1-7-110 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. §9-
261 (2012); DEL. CODE tit. 15, §4937 (2017); IOWA CODE §48A.7A, 48A.10A, 49.78, and 49.81 (2014); KY. REV. 
STAT. §117.227 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. §115-427 (2016); MONT. CODE §13-13-114 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. 
§659:13 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-114 (2016); S.C. CODE §7-13-710 (2014); UTAH CODE §20A-1-102(83) and 
20A-3-104 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE §29A.40.160(7)(a) (2017); W. VA. CODE §3-1-34 (2017). 
382 Underhill, supra note 325. 
383 Id. 
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also take additional steps after the election for their vote to count, such as returning to the local 
election official within days of the election to present their required ID.384 In non-strict states, 
voters lacking an ID may have the option to cast a provisional ballot to be counted without any 
further actions by the voter.385 For example, in Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, Rhode 
Island, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia, voters lacking ID cast a provisional ballot, and 
later, election officials use signature matching to verify the voter’s registration status.386  
First, the National Council of State Legislatures has classified 17 state laws as photo-ID 
required, including states with voter ID laws reviewed by courts in the case analysis and denoted 
by an asterisk in the table below, such as Georgia, Indiana, Wisconsin, Alabama, and Texas.387 
The other states included are Kansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, Arkansas, Florida, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.388 Table 2 and discussion 
that follows analyzed the relative “strictness” of the each of the state’s photo ID requirements.389 
For example, the table denotes various types of ID accepted to vote for each state.390 Then the 
discussion classifies some states as “stricter” than others if it accepted fewer types of IDs, and 
“less strict” if states accepted more forms of ID.391  
  
                                                          
384 Id. 
385 Id. 
386 Id. COLO. REV. STAT. §1-1-104(19.5) and 1-7-110 (2017); FLA. STAT. §101.043 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. §11-
136 (2014); MONT. CODE §13-13-114 (2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS §17-19-24.2 (2015); UTAH CODE §20A-1-102(83) and 
20A-3-104 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE §29A.40.160(7)(a) (2017); W. VA. CODE §3-1-34 (2017). 
387 Underhill, supra note 325. See GA. CODE §21-2-417 (2010); IND. CODE §3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2 and 3-11-8-25.1 
(2014); WIS. STAT. §5.02(6m) and 6.79(2)(a) (2014); ALA. CODE §17-9-30 (2013); TEX. ELEC. CODE §63.001 et seq. 
(2017). 
388 Underhill, supra note 325. See KAN. STAT. §25-2908, 25-1122, 25-3002, and 8-1324(g)(2) (2012); MISS. CODE 
§23-15-563 (2013); TENN. CODE §2-7-112(c) (2010); VA. CODE §24.2-643(b) (2016); ARK.  CONST. amend. 51, § 13. 
ARK. CODE § 7-1-101,201, 305, 308, 324, 409, and 412 (2015); FLA. STAT. §101.043 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. §11-
136 (2014); IDAHO CODE §34-1106(2), 1113, and 1114 (2017); LA. REV. STAT. §18:562 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§168.523 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS §17-19-24.2 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §12-18-6.1 and 6.2 (2014) 
389 Underhill, supra note 325. 
390 Id. 
391 Id. 
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Table 2. Photo ID Required by State Law & Types of Photo IDs Accepted 
State Driver’s 
License/State-issued 
ID / Free Voter ID 
Card 
Government 
Employee 
ID / 
Employee 
ID 
Passport/ 
Naturalization 
Certificate / 
Tribal ID 
Student ID 
/ Public 
Assistance 
Card  
Military ID / 
Veteran ID / 
Gun Permit 
Additional 
Information 
Indiana* DL, State, and Voter 
 
Gov’t P   Must have Name, 
Photo, and 
Expiration 
Georgia* DL, even if expired, 
State, and Voter 
Gov’t P and T  M   
Kansas DL-any state Gov’t P S and PA M and G  
Mississippi DL, State, and Voter Gov’t  P S M and G  
Tennessee DL and State   P  M and G  
Virginia DL and State  Gov’t and 
Employee 
P and T S   
Wisconsin* DL and State  P, N, and T S with 
expiration 
M and V May also need 
proof of residence 
Arkansas DL, State, and Voter  P S and PA M and G Must have Name, 
Photo, and 
Expiration 
Alabama* DL, State, and Voter Gov’t P and T S M  
Florida DL and State Gov’t  P S and PA M, V, and G Debit/Credit Card 
Ret./Neighborhood 
ID 
Hawaii  DL and State     Utility Bill/Bank 
Statement/ Check 
Idaho DL and State Gov’t  P and T S, even 
high school 
G  
Louisiana DL and State     Any other 
recognized ID 
Michigan DL and State - 
Expired I/S or 
current O/S 
Gov’t  P & T S, even 
high school 
M  
Rhode 
Island 
DL and State   P S, from any 
U.S. 
institution 
M and G Gov’t medical card 
South 
Dakota 
DL and State Gov’t P and T S   
Texas* 
 
 
DL, State, and Voter  P and N  M and G All within 4 years 
of expiration, exc. 
Nat cert.  
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Georgia accepts the following seven forms of ID to vote, including expired Georgia 
driver’s licenses, but not student IDs.392 Overall, the state was found to be “medium” strict.393  
Georgia was less strict than Indiana because Indiana requires name, expiration date, and 
photo issued only from the state or national government.394 Georgia, however, was both less and 
more strict than the Kansas law.395 Georgia was less strict than Kansas because Kansas only 
accepts expired IDs for people 65 and older.396 In contrast, Georgia was stricter because Kansas 
accepts a broader range of IDs, including student IDs and public assistance IDs.397 Georgia was 
also stricter than Mississippi because Mississippi accepts student IDs and firearms licenses.398 
Georgia was both less and more strict than Wisconsin.399 Georgia was stricter because 
Wisconsin accepts certificates of naturalization.400 On the other hand, Wisconsin is stricter 
because Wisconsin also requires proof of residence if the ID presented does not indicate the 
voter’s address.401 Also, even though Wisconsin accepts student IDs, few IDs practically qualify 
under the state condition mandating a signature and expiration date.  
In 2011, Texas enacted a voter ID law also accepting seven forms of ID, including a 
driver’s license, concealed carry permit, or citizenship certificate.402 All forms of ID, except for 
the citizenship certificate, may be presented within four years of expiration.403 Overall, the state 
                                                          
392 GA. CODE §21-2-417 (2010). 
393 Id. 
394 IND. CODE §3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2 and 3-11-8-25.1 (2014). 
395 KAN. STAT. §25-2908, 25-1122, 25-3002, and 8-1324(g)(2) (2012).  
396 Id. 
397 Id. 
398 MISS. CODE §23-15-563 (2013). 
399 WIS. STAT. §5.02(6m) and 6.79(2)(a) (2014). 
400 Id. 
401 Id. 
402 Id. 
403 Id. 
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was found to be “very” strict.404 In fact, the law was struck down by a court in 2014 in Veasey v. 
Perry, but higher courts stayed the injunction and later allowed the law to be applied.405  
 The district judge in Veasey even cited a 2014 study by the National Council of State 
Legislatures to show that the Texas law is “comparatively the strictest law in the country.”406 
Then, the court discussed safety net features, which Texas failed to adopt, “including soft 
rollouts (which Texas did not adopt), educational campaigns (which are lacking in Texas), the 
time frame during which an expired ID will be accepted (a matter on which Texas is relatively 
strict), the time frame in which provisional ballots may be cured (a matter on which Texas is 
arguably in the middle ground), and terms on which provisional ballots may be cured (where 
Texas’s requirements that the voter still produce a qualified photo ID make it strict).”407 
 The Texas law was stricter than Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, and Rhode Island laws.408 In 
fact, Hawaii does not even specify acceptable types of ID by law.409 The Hawaii office of 
elections does provide examples, including even non-photo IDs that contain a voter’s name and 
address.410 Idaho allows tribal IDs and student IDs as alternatives.411 Louisiana contains a catch-
all provision “other generally recognized picture IDs.”412 Rhode Island accepts valid and current 
IDs from any U.S. educational institution.413 On the other hand, Texas was less strict than South 
Dakota, which only accepts student IDs and tribal IDs as alternatives to state-issued IDs.414  
                                                          
404 Underhill, supra note 325. 
405 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014). 
406 Id. at 643. 
407 Id. 
408 Underhill, supra note 325. 
409 Id. 
410 HAW. REV. STAT. §11-136 (2014). 
411 IDAHO CODE §34-1106(2), 1113, and 1114 (2017). 
412 LA. REV. STAT. §18:562 (2011). 
413 R.I. GEN. LAWS §17-19-24.2 (2015). 
414 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §12-18-6.1 and 6.2 (2014). 
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Second, the National Council of State Legislatures classified 17 state laws as non-photo 
ID accepted, including Oklahoma’s ID law endorsed by the state Supreme Court in Gentges v. 
State Election Board in 2018, denoted by an asterisk in the table below.415 Other states included 
are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Arizona, North Dakota, and 
Ohio.416 The table below addressed the relative “strictness” of each state’s ID law by noting the 
types of ID accepted.417 Then, the discussion classified some states as “stricter” than others if 
they accepted fewer types of IDs, and “less strict” if the state accepted more forms of ID.418  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
415 Underhill, supra note 325. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-114 (2016) and Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018 
OK 39 (Okla. 2018). 
416 Underhill, supra note 325. See ALASKA STAT. §15.15.225 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §1-1-104(19.5) and 1-7-110 
(2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. §9-261 (2012); DEL. CODE tit. 15, §4937 (2017); IOWA CODE §48A.7A, 48A.10A, 49.78, 
and 49.81 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. §117.227 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. §115-427 (2016); MONT. CODE §13-13-114 
(2017); N.H. REV. STAT. §659:13 (2017); S.C. CODE §7-13-710 (2014); UTAH CODE §20A-1-102(83) and 20A-3-104 
(2010); WASH. REV. CODE §29A.40.160(7)(a) (2017); W. VA. CODE §3-1-34 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §16-579(A) 
(2012); N.D. CENT. CODE §16.1-05-07 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE §3503.16(B)(1)(a) and 3505.18(A)(1) (2006). 
417 Underhill, supra note 325. 
418 Id. 
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Table 3. Types of IDs Accepted, Including Non-Photo ID Accepted, by State Law  
State Driver’s 
License/State-
issued ID / Free 
Voter ID Card / 
Tribal ID  
Utility Bill/ 
Bank 
Statement / 
Check / 
Debit Card 
/ Credit 
Card 
Passport/ 
Naturalization 
Certificate / 
Birth Certificate 
/ Social Security 
Card  
Student ID / 
Government 
Employee ID 
/ Employee 
ID / Medicare 
or Medicaid 
ID 
Military ID 
/ Veteran 
ID / Gun 
Permit / 
Hunt 
License 
Additional 
Information 
Alaska DL and Voter U, B, and C P and BC  H  
Colorado DL  U, B, and C N and BC Gov’t and 
Med. 
M Revenue ID 
Pilot License 
Connecticut   SS   Any other with 
name and either 
address, 
signature, or 
photo 
Delaware DL and State 
 
U and C    Any other with 
name and address 
Iowa DL, State, and 
Voter 
 P  M   
Kentucky DL CC SS    
Missouri DL and State – 
any state 
U, B, and C  S   
Montana DL and T U, B, and C  S – even high 
school 
  
New 
Hampshire 
DL – any state, 
State, and Voter 
 P S M Any other ID 
accepted by 
election 
supervisors 
Oklahoma* DL, State, and 
T 
    Any other with 
name, photo, and 
expiration 
South 
Carolina 
DL, State, and 
Voter 
 P  M Affidavit and 
reasonable 
impediment 
Utah DL, State, and 
T 
 P  M and G 2 forms of ID 
with name and 
address 
Washington DL, State, and 
T 
  S and E   
Virginia DL, State, and 
T 
 P S and E M  
Arizona DL, State, and 
T 
U and B  Gov’t  Other Unique 
Examples 
North Dakota DL, State, and 
T 
U, B, and C    Requires Name, 
Address, and 
DOB 
Ohio DL and State U, B, and C    Requires Name, 
Address, Photo, 
and Exp. Date  
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Oklahoma requires “proof of identity” showing one’s name, a photograph, and expiration 
date, issued by either the federal government, state, or an Indian tribe.419 The state also offers a 
non-photo voter registration card.420 Overall, the state was found to be “medium” strict.421  
Compared to Colorado and Washington, the Oklahoma law is less strict because both 
states provide specific lists of ID options.422 Both Colorado and Washington, however, recently 
passed laws resulting in mostly voting by mail now, so the ID provision doesn’t have as large of 
an impact in these states.423 Compared to Delaware, Oklahoma was stricter because Delaware’s 
broad catch-all provision allows “any government document with a voter’s name and 
address.”424  
The Oklahoma law was less strict than the current Iowa law, but Iowa is transitioning to 
requiring a photo ID before voting.425 Currently, Iowa provides a list of acceptable IDs, 
including non-photo ID cards, or sign an oath verifying identity to cast a regular ballot.426 In 
2019, voters will either produce an ID or cast a provisional ballot and show up after the election 
with an ID, so the National Council of State Legislatures might reclassify Iowa as a “strict, non-
photo ID” state in 2019.427 On the other hand, Oklahoma was stricter than New Hampshire 
because New Hampshire accepts driver’s licenses from any state, even expired licenses.428 
                                                          
419 OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-114 (2016).  
420 Id. 
421 Underhill, supra note 325. 
422 COLO. REV. STAT. §1-1-104(19.5) and 1-7-110 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE §29A.40.160(7)(a) (2017).  
423 Underhill, supra note 325. 
424 DEL. CODE tit. 15, §4937 (2017). 
425 Underhill, supra note 325. 
426 IOWA CODE §48A.7A, 48A.10A, 49.78, and 49.81 (2014).  
427 Id. 
428 N.H. REV. STAT. §659:13 (2017) 
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Arizona allows a broad, unique list of non-photo ID options, including a valid Arizona 
vehicle registration, vehicle insurance card, property tax statement or Indian census card.429 Ohio 
was stricter because the photo option requires the ID be current and valid with the voter’s name, 
address, photo, and expiration date.430 Ohio’s non-photo option is only a voter’s current utility 
bill, bank statement, government check, or paycheck.431 For a state that did not require any ID to 
cast a ballot until 2013, North Dakota is about as strict as Ohio’s law.432  
Third, the National Council of State Legislatures classifies ten states as strict because 
these state laws require voters to return to a local election offical with an ID within days of an 
election for their provisional ballot to count.433 The states included are Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, 
Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, Arizona, North Dakota, and Ohio with an asterisk 
denoting states laws reviewed by courts in the case analysis.434 Table 3 and following discussion 
ranks the additional steps required to cast a provisional ballot from least to most onerous.435  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
429 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §16-579(A) (2012).  
430 OHIO REV. CODE §3503.16(B)(1)(a) and 3505.18(A)(1) (2006).  
431 Id. 
432 Underhill, supra note 325. 
433 Id.   
434 Id.  See GA. CODE §21-2-417 (2010); IND. CODE §3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2 and 3-11-8-25.1 (2014); KAN. STAT. 
§25-2908, 25-1122, 25-3002, and 8-1324(g)(2) (2012); MISS. CODE §23-15-563 (2013); TENN. CODE §2-7-112(c) 
(2010); VA. CODE §24.2-643(b) (2016); WIS. STAT. §5.02(6m) and 6.79(2)(a) (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §16-579(A) 
(2012); N.D. CENT. CODE §16.1-05-07 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE §3503.16(B)(1)(a) and 3505.18(A)(1) (2006). 
435 Underhill, supra note 325. 
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Table 4. Strict Provisional Voting by State Law & Subsequent Deadlines 
State (ranked 
from least to 
most strict)  
Return with ID 
Before Polls 
Close 
Return with ID After Election Affidavit  Other Options 
Ohio – has 
tiered options 
 Last option: by the 10th day 
after Election Day 
2nd option 1st option: Provide last four digits 
of social security number 
Kansas  By meeting of the county 
board of canvassers  
 Submit a copy by mail or 
electronic means.  
Virginia  By noon on the 3rd day after 
the election 
 Submit a copy of ID by fax, e-
mail, or mail.  
Arizona  By 5 pm on the 5th business 
day after the election 
  
Mississippi  Five days after the election   
Georgia*  Three days after the election   
Tennessee  By end of 2nd business day 
after the election  
  
Indiana*  By noon on Monday after the 
election 
  
North Dakota X By sixth day after the election.    
Wisconsin* X By 4pm on Friday after 
Election Day 
  
 
As per the “strict” classification, generally, all states required additional steps by the 
voter for their provisional ballot to count.436 The least onerous state was Ohio’s tiered system, 
which first requests a social security number to cast a provisional ballot.437 If the voter lacks both 
ID and a social security number, then the voter may execute an affidavit to cast a provisional 
ballot.438 If a voter declines to execute an affidavit, the state requires the voter return with proof 
of ID within ten days of the election.439 Both Kansas and Virginia offered voters an option of 
                                                          
436 Id. 
437 OHIO REV. CODE §3503.16(B)(1)(a) and 3505.18(A)(1) (2006). 
438 Id. 
439 Id. 
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submitting a copy of their ID via electronic means, such as fax or e-mail.440 The most onerous 
state is Wisconsin, which requires voters to return with ID before the polls close, but also 
provides an alternative of no later than 4 p.m. on Friday following Election Day.441  
In July 2016, a federal district court ruled that Wisconsin’s voter ID law was 
unconstitutional in One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Thomsen.442 The opinion included an 
anecdotal account of Mrs. Smith who lived in Milwaukee since 2003, but was born in Missouri 
in 1916.443 Like many older African Americans born in the South, she does not have a birth 
certificate.444 Thus, the state did not issue her a Wisconsin ID, and she could not vote in the April 
2016 primary.445 The court found Mrs. Smith’s compelling story to represent the experiences of 
about 100 qualified voters who tried to obtain a state ID before the 2016 primary.446 The court 
stated that the state must allow an alternative for provisional voting, such as signing an 
affidavit.447  
The district court also stated a need to reevaluate Frank and Crawford because this case 
casts doubt that voter ID laws foster integrity in elections.448 The district court found Wisconsin 
to be preoccupied mostly with “phantom election fraud” leading to real disenfranchisement.449 
While rejecting the plaintiff’s facial challenge as a whole citing Frank and Crawford, the judge 
                                                          
440 KAN. STAT. §25-2908, 25-1122, 25-3002, and 8-1324(g)(2) (2012); VA. CODE §24.2-643(b) (2016). 
441 WIS. STAT. §5.02(6m) and 6.79(2)(a) (2014). 
442 One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Mark Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896 (W.D. Wis. 2016). A footnote on the 
National Council of State Legislatures’ website stated that Wisconsin’s voter ID law was deemed unconstitutional 
by a federal court in July 2016. Using the Westlaw database, the researcher analyzed the case to determine that the 
court did not rule the entire law unconstitutional, but instead, only focused on the burdensome amount of supporting 
documents required to obtain a free state-issued photo ID. Underhill, supra note 325, n. 7.  
443 One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Mark Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 901.  
444 Id. 
445 Id.  
446 Id.  
447 Id. 
448 Id. at 903. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014) and Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
449 One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 903. 
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indicated the disastrous effects of the state-issued ID provision, ironically intended by the state 
as a safety net.450 If a voter lacks a birth certificate, it takes an average of five communications 
with the DMV after the initial application to get an ID.451 This Wisconsin district court found the 
free ID provision to be unconstitutionally burdensome, but allowed the state to implement the 
law in 2016 as long as it pledged to provide temporary free IDs and publicize the law.452 
Fourth, the National Council of State Legislatures classifies the largest cluster of 24 states 
as non-strict because these state ID laws offer on-site alternatives for in-person voters lacking an 
appropriate ID.453 The states included are Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, 
and West Virginia, with an asterisk in the table below denoting any ID law reviewed by courts in 
the subsequent case analysis.454 Table 4 and the discussion that follows ranks the additional steps 
required to cast a provisional ballot from least to most onerous amongst the states.455  
 
 
 
                                                          
450 Id. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014) and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 
553 U.S. 181 (2008).  
451 One Wisconsin Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 903. 
452 Id. at 903-04. 
453 Underhill, supra note 325. 
454 Id.  See ARK.  CONST. amend. 51, § 13. ARK. CODE § 7-1-101,201, 305, 308, 324, 409, and 412 (2015); ALA. 
CODE §17-9-30 (2013); FLA. STAT. §101.043 (2016); HAW. REV. STAT. §11-136 (2014); IDAHO CODE §34-1106(2), 
1113, and 1114 (2017); LA. REV. STAT. §18:562 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS §168.523 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS §17-
19-24.2 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §12-18-6.1 and 6.2 (2014); TEX. ELEC. CODE §63.001 et seq. (2017); ALASKA 
STAT. §15.15.225 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §1-1-104(19.5) and 1-7-110 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. §9-261 (2012); 
DEL. CODE tit. 15, §4937 (2017); IOWA CODE §48A.7A, 48A.10A, 49.78, and 49.81 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. §117.227 
(2014); MO. REV. STAT. §115-427 (2016); MONT. CODE §13-13-114 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. §659:13 (2017); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 26, § 7-114 (2016); S.C. CODE §7-13-710 (2014); UTAH CODE §20A-1-102(83) and 20A-3-104 (2010); 
WASH. REV. CODE §29A.40.160(7)(a) (2017); W. VA. CODE §3-1-34 (2017). 
455 Underhill, supra note 325. 
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Table 5. Non-Strict Provisional Voting by State Law & Subsequent Steps 
State (ranked from 
least to most strict)  
Signature matching /  
Verify Information /  
State’s method 
unclear  
Affidavit / Written 
Oath / Detailed 
Affidavit 
Requires Supporting 
Documents 
Option to Return with 
ID  
Florida, Montana, 
Rhode Island, 
Washington, and 
West Virginia 
Signature matching     
Hawaii Verify DOB and 
address  
   
Alaska Cast “questioned 
ballot” 
   
Colorado Prelim verify by an 
election official 
   
Utah County clerk verifies 
identity & residence  
   
Delaware, Idaho, 
Michigan, and  
South Dakota 
 Affidavit   
Iowa and Kentucky 
 
 Written Oath   
Connecticut 
 
 
 Write name, 
address, date of 
birth, and sign on 
state’s form.  
  
Oklahoma* 
 
 
 Write name, 
address, birth date, 
and driver’s license 
or social security 
number.  
  
New Hampshire  Challenged voter 
affidavit 
The poll clerk takes a 
photo of the voter.  
 
Louisiana 
 
 Sign affidavit  Provide voter ID 
card, date of birth, or 
other information.  
 
Texas* 
 
 Reasonable 
Impediment  
Present a form of 
“supporting ID.”  
 
Missouri  2 election judges 
affirm identity.  
  
Arkansas 
 
No county board 
challenges, or  
  By 12 pm Monday 
after the election 
Alabama*  2 election officials 
affirm identity, or 
 By 5 pm on Friday 
after the election  
South Carolina  Reasonable 
Impediment, or  
 By Thurs./Friday after 
the election 
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The least onerous states were Florida, Rhode Island, Montana, Washington, and West 
Virginia, which use signature matching.456 Next, Alaska, Colorado, and Utah require no extra 
steps on the part of the voter, but are unclear as to what is involved after a provisional ballot is 
cast.457 For example, county clerks in Utah verify a voter’s ID “through some other means.”458  
New Hampshire offers a unique provisional ballot model that genuinely seeks to identify 
cases of voter fraud by allowing voters lacking ID to execute a “challenged voter affidavit” and 
immediately have their picture taken, absent a religious objection.459 Then, within 90 days after 
the election, the secretary of state sends a non-forwardable letter to each voter who executed an 
affidavit and instructs the person to return the letter within 90 days as written confirmation of 
voting or to contact the attorney general if they did not vote, signaling the attorney general to 
investigate for voter fraud.460 
Louisiana and Texas require supporting documents along with a voter affidavit.461 In 
Texas, a voter must submit a supporting form of ID, such as a voter registration card, original 
birth certificate, utility bill, bank statement, government check, or paycheck.462 In addition, the 
voter in Texas must execute a Reasonable Impediment Declaration, noting their impediment to 
obtaining photo identification.463   
Arkansas, Alabama, and South Carolina are the most onerous states because they give 
voters the option of returning with appropriate identification.464 Arkansas generally counts 
                                                          
456 FLA. STAT. §101.043 (2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS §17-19-24.2 (2015); MONT. CODE §13-13-114 (2017); WASH. REV. 
CODE §29A.40.160(7)(a) (2017); W. VA. CODE §3-1-34 (2017). 
457 ALASKA STAT. §15.15.225 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §1-1-104(19.5) and 1-7-110 (2017); UTAH CODE §20A-1-
102(83) and 20A-3-104 (2010). 
458 UTAH CODE §20A-1-102(83) and 20A-3-104 (2010). 
459 N.H. REV. STAT. §659:13 (2017). 
460 Id. 
461 Underhill, supra note 325. 
462 TEX. ELEC. CODE §63.001 et seq. (2017). 
463 Id. 
464 Underhill, supra note 325. 
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provisional ballots unless the board of election commissioners determines it is invalid and should 
not count.465 Alternatively, voters may return to the board with appropriate ID by noon on 
Monday following the election.466 In 2017, the Arkansas legislature passed a statute allowing 
voters lacking an ID to sign an affidavit to be registered.467 The law was struck down by a 
district court in April 2018, but the state supreme court allowed the law for the May 2018 
primary, pending the outcome on appeal.468 Alabama allows two poll workers to attest to a 
voter’s identity or allows a voter to cast a provisional ballot if they return by Friday after the 
election with their ID.469 Finally, South Carolina, like Texas, allows voters to execute a 
Reasonable Impediment Declaration or return with ID before certifying election results.470  
As a cautionary tale, comparing any two ID laws creates false equivalences. For example, 
even though Georgia and Texas both accept seven forms of ID, the Georgia Supreme Court 
upheld the Georgia law in Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, while a federal district court 
struck down the Texas law in Veasey v. Perry.471 If presenting an ID is only about verification, 
Arizona offers a broad list of non-photo options with a voters’ name and address.472 Finally, the 
Wisconsin district court opinion of One Wisconsin Institute v. Thomsen demonstrates that free 
voter ID cards may not always be easily accessible, especially for African Americans born in the 
South in the early 1900s lacking any documentation of live birth.473 Regarding provisional 
                                                          
465 ARK.  CONST. amend. 51, § 13. ARK. CODE § 7-1-101,201, 305, 308, 324, 409, and 412 (2015). 
466 Id. 
467 Underhill, supra note 325. 
468 Id. 
469 ALA. CODE §17-9-30 (2013). 
470 S.C. CODE §7-13-710 (2014). 
471 GA. CODE §21-2-417 (2010) and TEX. ELEC. CODE §63.001 et seq. (2017). 
472 ARIZ. REV. STAT. §16-579(A) (2012). 
473 One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Mark Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 901 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
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ballots, only ten states require voters lacking ID to make an additional trip, while a majority have 
shifted to less onerous options.474  
Finally, New Hampshire’s provisional voting procedure seems to be the only law actively 
seeking to identify cases of fraud.475 Any voter who lacks required ID executes a “challenged 
voter affidavit” and immediately has their picture taken.476 Then, within 90 days of the election, 
the secretary of state sends a letter to each voter who completed an affidavit.477 The letter 
instructs the recipient to either return the letter within 90 days to confirm voting or to contact the 
attorney general if they did not to initiate an investigation of voter fraud.478  
U.S. Constitutional Challenges 
Of the seven cases analyzed, only three raised challenges under the U.S. Constitution. Of 
those three, just a single case pre-dating Crawford raised a free expression argument, and on 
appeal, that law was ultimately held to be constitutional.479 In fact, only one case found a voter 
ID law unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution.480 As for state constitutional challenges to 
voter ID laws, three of the four challenged laws were found constitutional.481 Even if plaintiffs 
succeeded in showing a burden on voting rights, courts still found the states’ interests in 
implementing the law outweighed the burden in a balancing test.482 A state constitutional 
challenge, however, was the only case to convince a judge to review the law under the highest 
                                                          
474 Underhill, supra note 325. 
475 N.H. REV. STAT. §659:13 (2017). 
476 Id.  
477 Id. 
478 Id. 
479 The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008) 
480 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014). 
481 Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, 288 Ga. 720 (2011); League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Educ. 
Network v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360 (Wis. 2014); Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018 OK 39 (Okla. 2018). 
482 League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Educ. Network v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360 (Wis. 2014); Gentges v. State 
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level of judicial review, strict scrutiny.483 For both U.S. and state constitution challenges, this 
section provides examples of ID laws deemed constitutional and unconstitutional by courts, 
noting any themes or unique points in the rationale. 
Predating the 2008 U.S. Supreme Court case, Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board,484 a district court in New Mexico provided a pioneering in-depth analysis of a local law 
requiring voters required to present a current and valid photo identification card before voting in 
person.485 In American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, residents and voting 
organizations sued the Albuquerque city clerk alleging the voter-approved 2005 amendments to 
the local Election Code were unconstitutional.486 Santillanes is the only case analyzed where the 
plaintiffs raised a separate First Amendment free expression argument from their Fourteenth 
Amendment claim. 
Under the amendments, local election officials accepted various types of photo and non-
photo IDs.487 If the voter lacked an ID, then the voter completed an affidavit and cast a 
provisional ballot.488 As in Crawford, the law mandated the voter return with an ID within ten 
days of the election for the ballot to count.489 Finally, the city provided free photo IDs at any 
time, even on the day of the election.490   
Both sides filed motions for summary judgment, wherein the judge applied the standard 
of no genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings and supporting affidavits, and the 
                                                          
483 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD 2012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
484 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
485 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598, 606 (D.N.M. 2007), rev'd sub nom. The 
Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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487 The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.491 At the district court level, the plaintiffs 
succeeded with the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim, but the city prevailed in the 
alternate First Amendment free expression claims.492  
The City argued that the new law advanced its interest in preventing voter fraud.493 The 
plaintiffs suggested that the amendment imposed an unconstitutional burden on their right to 
vote.494 Specifically, they objected to being subjected to more stringent identification 
requirements since they choose to vote in person, rather than absentee voting.495 In addition, the 
plaintiffs contended that the amendment is subject to different and arbitrary interpretation by 
local election officials based on the vague phrase of “current and valid.”496 
First, the judge considered each of the various levels of judicial scrutiny.497 The City 
argued that the Court should apply rational-basis scrutiny because plaintiffs failed to present 
evidence that the city enacted the new law with an “invidious discriminatory purpose, such as 
targeting a ‘suspect class’ of voters.”498 The Court dismissed this argument because the 
plaintiff’s prospective challenge to the City’s new photo identification requirement is based on a 
threatened injury since they have not yet participated in a municipal election yet.499  
The plaintiffs contended that the Court should apply strict scrutiny because the 
amendment implicated their fundamental right to vote.500 The defendants countered that strict 
scrutiny did not apply because the Constitution does not recognize a “fundamental right” to vote 
                                                          
491 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 606. 
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in person, as opposed to some other voting method such as absentee voting.501 The defendants 
analogized to Bush v. Gore wherein the Supreme Court declared, “[t]he individual citizen has no 
federal constitutional right to vote for electors…unless and until the state legislature chooses a 
statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members to the Electoral 
College.”502 The Court disagreed with the City.503 Instead, the court asserted that the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of voting as a fundamental right does not hinge on whether the Constitution 
itself mandates the city to allow citizens to vote in person at a polling place.504 The Court did still 
recognize the fundamental right to vote, even when the source of that right lies in state or local 
law.505 The court added the right to vote is more than the initial grant of the right, and so equal 
protection claims may also arise surrounding the logistical exercise of the right.506  
On the other hand, the court followed the precedent from Burdick v. Takushi by not 
automatically applying strict scrutiny to the claims.507 In Burdick, the Supreme Court mandated 
that a court determine the appropriate level of scrutiny based on the severity of the burden that 
the challenged law imposes on the right to vote.508 Thus, to leave sufficient room for state and 
local government to orderly administer elections, recent precedent applies an intermediate level 
of scrutiny, which provides a flexible standard for reviewing constitutional claims to election 
laws.509  
Applying the Burdick balancing test concerning the Equal Protection claim, the first step 
is to “ascertain ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury of the rights protected by the 
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503 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 627. 
504 Id. at 627-28. 
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First and Fourteenth Amendments.’”510 The court focused on the claims asserting arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement of the law among similarly situated in-person voters.511 The judge 
gave less emphasis to the more stringent identification required for in-person compared with 
absentee voting because the court acknowledged the practical differences required for each 
voting method.512   
On the arbitrary enforcement claim, the new law did not set criteria for what qualified as 
“current” or “valid” identification cards.513 Based on the deposition testimony of the City Clerk, 
defendant Millie Santillanes, she said that each election judge, or precinct worker, made this 
determination.514 The court drew Equal Protection reasoning from early voting-rights cases.515  
 Under more similar facts in 2006, Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, a district court 
reasoned that Georgia’s photo identification law imposed an undue burden on the right to vote 
for voters who lacked the necessary requisite identification.516 Plus, the court found that these 
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511 Am.Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 631. 
512 Id. 
513 Id. 
514 Id. 
515 Id. In 2000, the Supreme Court announced in Bush v. Gore that one of the constitutional defects in Florida’s 
recount method was that it required recount teams to determine “the intent of the voter” based upon ballot markings, 
but lacked statewide objective criteria for recount teams. Id. at 632. See 531 U.S. at 106. Similarly, in 1965, the 
Court struck down Louisiana’s “interpretation test” in Louisiana v. United States. 380 U.S. 145, 149 (1965).  The 
test required every voter applicant to “give a reasonable interpretation” of any section of the State or Federal 
Constitution to the satisfaction of the local registrar. Id. Again, the Court stated the problem with the test was that it 
gave registrars “virtually uncontrolled discretion.” Id. at 150.  Although Louisiana predated Burdick and Bush did 
not apply the balance test, both cases applied heightened scrutiny since the burden on voting rights was substantial. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F.Supp.2d at 633. 
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be a substantial obstacle on core political speech because the requirement has the effect of discouraging potential 
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516 Am.Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 634. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 
439 F.Supp.2d 1294, 1345–50 (N.D.Ga.2006). 
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voters would have insufficient time and resources to learn about this new requirement and make 
necessary arrangements before the next election.517 
 Comparing Billups to the present case, the Santillanes district court found the plaintiffs 
had more time than Georgia voters to prepare for the next election, but showed fewer efforts to  
educate city voters of new voting requirements.518 Therefore, the court concluded that the 2005 
amendment imposed a significant burden on the right to vote.519 Plaintiff showed that confusion 
about the photo ID requirement was likely to result and could disenfranchise many voters.520  
Since the law significantly impaired voting rights, the burden of proof shifted to the City 
to show the voting obstacle was narrowly tailored to meet the government interest served.521 The 
City claimed that preventing voter impersonation was the precise reasoning for initiating the 
identification requirement.522 The court, however, found the amendment said nothing about fraud 
or irregularities in voter registration or absentee voting.523 Further, the City put forth no 
admissible evidence of voter impersonation fraud in past municipal elections and only provided 
one alleged instance of voter impersonation that occurred in the 2004 presidential election.524 
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officials who admitted to being behind in federal election law compliance in Crawford, the City offered no proof 
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Another strike against the City was the exception made for absentee voters.525 Defendants 
asserted that in-person and absentee voters were not similarly situated groups for an Equal 
Protection claim.526 While not disputing this fact, the court determined that the absentee voter 
exception undermined the City’s argument that the goal was to prevent future cases of voter 
impersonation.527  
 Finally, the court found the law aimed at preventing voter fraud at the polls seemed to 
lack stringency when issuing city-issued ID cards.528 Under this new law, Albuquerque residents 
are required to show a current and valid photo ID to cast a ballot in-person.529 Even for voters 
lacking an ID must provide their date of birth and the last four digits of their Social Security 
number to cast a provisional ballot, and then return to the City Clerk's office with an ID card 
within ten days the election for the ballot to count.530 In contrast, to obtain a city-issued photo ID 
card, the city only required a person to provide one’s name and to attest they were unable to 
provide the listed identification documents under the penalty of perjury.531 Thus, the court 
concluded that the 2005 amendment lacked a “plausible, close-fitting relationship” to preventing 
voter fraud and less restrictive alternatives were available.532 Thus, the amendment violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.533  
 The plaintiff’s primary First Amendment claims relied on the “void for vagueness” 
doctrine because the law provided no clear definition of what criteria make a photo ID “current” 
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and “valid.”534 Citing NAACP v. Button, the plaintiffs explained that an impermissibly vague law 
under the First Amendment tends to have a chilling effect on the exercise of constitutionally 
protected expression.535 The plaintiffs argued that when voting, they engaged in core political 
speech as a symbolic gesture like assembling for a protest or waving a picket sign.536 The 
plaintiffs asserted that by appearing in-person to exercise the franchise, they conveyed a public 
message to the community about the importance of democracy under First Amendment theory.537  
 The court found that the plaintiff’s First Amendment theory-based argument conflated 
voting in a non-public forum with core political speech that takes place in a traditional public 
forum.538 The court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that it is necessary to restrict 
speech in non-public forums to protect the right to vote.539 For example, in Burson v. Freeman, a 
plurality of the Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee law that prohibited soliciting votes or 
displaying campaign materials within 100 feet of polling place entrances.540 The rationale for the 
Burson decision was that although the Tennessee law presented an impediment to exercising the 
fundamental right to vote, the State had a sufficiently compelling interest in prohibiting 
expression to protect the right to vote.541  
 Also, since people vote secretly in a protected booth, the Santillanes district court 
questioned whether voting sends the symbolic message to community members that the plaintiffs 
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claimed.542 The Santillanes court suggested that if plaintiffs wanted to make a public statement 
along with exercising the franchise, then they should hold a demonstration in a traditional public 
forum, such as a sidewalk or street the appropriate number of feet from their polling place.543 
Thus, the ID requirement placed no burden on plaintiff’s public demonstration ability.544  
 The Santillanes district court held that the plaintiffs did not need to rely on a separate and 
distinct First Amendment theory to justify a heightened level of judicial scrutiny.545 The “void 
for vagueness” doctrine was not limited to just their First Amendment claim, and plaintiffs could 
also raise the issue within their Equal Protection claim.546 Therefore, the court granted summary 
judgment for the City concerning the Plaintiff’s First Amendment “void for vagueness” claim.547  
After the district court handed down Santillanes, but before oral arguments on appeal at 
the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court handed down the Crawford decision, which upheld the 
similarly crafted Indiana photo ID law against a facial equal protection challenge and created 
binding precedent for federal courts nationwide.548 The Tenth Circuit appellate court reviewed 
the Santillanes court’s grant of summary judgment on the equal protection claim de novo, with 
no deference given to the lower court.549 The City asserted several errors on appeal, including 
that the voting law properly distinguished between in-person and absentee voters, the district 
court improperly applied heightened judicial scrutiny, and the photo ID law was not 
unconstitutionally vague.550 The Tenth Circuit reviewed each in turn.551  
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 First, the plaintiffs contended on appeal that the law created an arbitrary distinction 
between in-person and absentee voters since any Albuquerque voter may choose to vote absentee 
and not present an ID.552 Further, the plaintiffs argued that the greater opportunity to absentee 
vote increased the chances for “mischief” and created a greater need to treat all voters alike.553 
This argument did not persuade the Tenth Circuit since the appeals court stated that absentee 
voting fundamentally differs from in-person voting with its own set of governing procedures.554  
 Second, after a lengthy discussion of the various levels of judicial scrutiny, the district 
court had applied intermediate scrutiny as established in Burdick.555 The first prong of the 
balancing test is to identify the alleged infringement on the right to vote.556 The lower court 
inappropriately focused on the city’s failure to educate voters about the law and found its 
application would be confusing.557 The appellate court found that in the absence of any 
indication of voter confusion, the law cannot be invalidated based on lack of education alone.558  
The court stated, “Our task is not to mandate a perfect system-just one that meets 
constitutional requirements.”559 In Crawford, the Supreme Court concluded that the burdens 
imposed by the photo ID law did not substantially burden the right to vote.560 The Court went on 
to provide the following examples to illustrate the minimal burden of the law: 
[A] voter may lose his photo identification, may have his wallet stolen on the way 
to the polls, or may not resemble the photo in the identification because he recently 
grew a beard. Burdens of that sort arising out of life's vagaries, however, are neither 
so serious nor so frequent as to raise any question about the constitutionality of [the 
photo identification law].561 
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The second prong of the Burdick balance test required the court to balance the burdens imposed 
against the state’s justifications for the law.562 While the lower court required the City to present 
evidence of specific instances of voter fraud, the appellate court held this to be too high a burden 
on the City because the Supreme Court did not require Indiana to do so in Crawford.563 
 Finally, the Santillanes district court held the amendment to be vague because it left 
defining the meanings of “current” and “valid” to the discretion of local election judges.564 The 
Tenth Circuit court examined the text of the amendment, including its non-exclusive list of 
acceptable identifications, including government-issued identification, student identification 
cards, credit or debit cards, insurance cards, union cards, and professional association cards 
without requiring cards include an address or expiration date.565 Thus, the appeals court found 
the law to be even less restrictive than the Indiana law requiring an expiration date, which was 
upheld by the Supreme Court in Crawford.566  Further, the Tenth Circuit found the words 
“current” and “valid” not to be vague because the federal HAVA statute uses those terms for all 
first-time voters in federal elections to present a “current and valid photo identification.”567 
Texas’s voter ID law has been mired in litigation since its inception.568 In Veasey v. 
Perry, a group of plaintiffs immediately challenged S.B. 14 under the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, alleging the law denied free speech and free association through voting and 
participation in elections.569 They argued that strict scrutiny ought to be applied to analyze the 
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law.570 The Texas district court stated that an individual’s right to vote is implied in the First 
Amendment and protected as fundamental by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and 
Equal Protection clauses.571 Specifically, an equal protection claim applies either when a state 
“classifies voters in disparate ways, or places restrictions on the right to vote.”572 As did the 
district court in Santillanes, the Veasey district court applied intermediate scrutiny and balanced 
the burden on the plaintiff’s right to vote against the legitimacy of the State’s interests and the 
extent those state interests required imposing these burdens on the franchise.573   
Before S.B. 14 went into effect, the only document required for a voter to cast a ballot 
was their voter registration certificate, which did not include a photograph.574 Then, the court 
explains the challenged provisions of S.B. 14, effective on January 1, 2012, which dictated the 
only acceptable forms of ID were a driver’s license, state-issued ID, concealed carry permit, 
military ID, citizenship certificate, or U.S. passport.575 If a voter lacks an ID, then the person 
may obtain an election identification certificate from the Department of Public Safety upon 
presenting satisfactory proof of identity.576 The court included a chart illustrating the acceptable 
forms of identification in Texas compared with other states to illustrate how comparatively S.B. 
14 is among the strictest in the nation.577  
The State filed a motion to dismiss on various grounds, including that the Supreme Court 
automatically approved voter ID laws in two prior cases, Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of 
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Arizona, Inc. and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.578 In denying the state’s motion at 
a preliminary hearing, the district court judge, Nelva Gonzales Ramos, found Texas overstated 
the Supreme Court’s approval of ID laws.579 Then, in a rare U.S. Constitutional challenge, the 
Veasey plaintiffs successfully produced sufficient evidence at trial to show the law significantly 
burdened voting rights. First, the district court again with Judge Ramos presiding described the 
state’s history of racial disparity in voting.580 Second, using legislative history, plaintiffs showed 
S.B. 14 was the Texas Legislature’s fourth, increasingly strict attempt to enact a voter ID law.581  
The State proffered two rationales for the increasing strictness of the law.582 First, since 
the 2010 U.S. Census revealed a large increase in the Hispanic population in Texas, the 
proponents identified preventing voter fraud as a priority.583 In 2011, proponents focused on 
proposed legislation addressing the dangers of illegal immigration, including redistricting, 
eliminating sanctuary cities, speaking English-only, and rolling back provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act.584 Another rationale offered was increasing public confidence in elections 
and voter turnout.585 The State, however, provided no evidence to support any of the following 
                                                          
578 Veasey v. Perry, 29 F.Supp.3d at 912 (citing Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2247, 
2253-54 (2013) and Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008)).  
579 Veasey v. Perry, 29 F.Supp.3d at 912-24. First, Inter Tribal only addressed an Arizona state law requiring proof 
of citizenship for voter registration. Id. at 912.Second, the Indiana law in Crawford only survived a Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection challenge. Id. at 913.  The Court addressed no other constitutional violations, and the 
Crawford plaintiffs made no claims that the law discriminated based on race, ethnic origin, or sex. Id. 
580 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d at 633-39. Even though plaintiffs produced documented evidence showing 
Alabama is another southern state with a history of denying the franchise based on race, the district court in Greater 
Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, however, focused on how penalties for voter fraud existed since the 1850s while 
also referring to increased documented cases of absentee voter fraud in more recent history. Cf. Greater Birmingham 
Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1257. (N.D. Ala. 2018). 
581 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d at 645. 
582 Id.  
583 Id. at 653-54. 
584 Id. at 654. 
585Id. at 655. 
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claims:  (a) voter turnout was low due to lack of confidence in elections, (b) a voter ID law 
would increase confidence, or (c) increased election confidence would increase voter turnout.586  
 Instead, the evidence showed that S.B. 14’s discriminatory effect for various reasons.587 
First, the law specifically burdened Texans living in poverty, who are less likely to possess a 
qualified ID or be able to obtain one and more likely to be African Americans and Hispanic 
voters.588 Relatedly, African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to live in poverty due to 
systemic barriers caused by decades of racial discrimination.589  
 The State argued that none of the individual plaintiffs would be disenfranchised or 
substantially burdened because those over age 65 and the disabled can vote by mail.590 The court 
found, however, the evidence indicated that the absentee ballot system is not an appropriate 
alternative because a greater risk of voter fraud exists.591 For example, campaign workers could 
harvest mail-in ballots by raiding mailboxes.592 The court heard testimony from many people 
who prefer to vote in-person because they distrust mail-in ballots.593 Especially within the 
African American community, in-person voting is a celebration of overcoming suffrage obstacles 
and implicitly evoking the free expression values of individual autonomy and self-realization.594  
Second, the State suggested that any remaining plaintiffs can get a free qualified ID, but 
choose not to do so. The court chastised the state for failing to appreciate the realities of those 
living in poverty who are unable to pay costs associated with traveling and obtaining a “free” 
                                                          
586 Id.  
587 Id. at 664. 
588 Id. 
589 Id.  
590 Id. at 676. 
591 Id.  
592 Id. 
593 Id. 
594 Id. The court citied testimony from Reverend Johnson who said he considers appearing at the polls part of his 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. Id. at 676-77.  
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qualified ID.595 The court said, “The poor should not be denied the right to vote because they 
have chosen to spend their money to feed their family.”596  
The district court also had to align the results of the case with existing jurisprudence, 
including Crawford and Frank v. Walker, wherein the Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin’s ID 
law that is similar to the Texas S.B. 14.597 The Frank trial court struck down the Wisconsin law 
because the court found the state’s interests in preventing fraud and restoring public confidence 
to be weak.598 The judge balanced the state’s weak justifications against the same voting burdens 
placed upon Texas voters, which included understanding the requirements, obtaining supporting 
documents, traveling between residences and offices that issue election IDs, and possibly a lack 
of transportation.599 The Frank court found enough voters could be potentially disenfranchised to 
sway elections.600 Judge Lynn Adelman permanently enjoined the law, but on appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court and upheld the law citing Crawford.601  
 Agreeing with the Frank trial court reasoning, the Veasey district court distinguished 
their facts from the Frank and Crawford cases.602 First, the Texas plaintiffs presented evidence 
of attempts to overcome the obstacles required to obtain an election ID, such as finding a local 
office.603 Next, the plaintiffs presented evidence of the cost to obtain the necessary documents to 
obtain a state-issued ID.604 Third, the record contained historical evidence of discrimination in 
Texas and the extraordinary efforts of the Texas Legislature to pass S.B. 14.605 Finally, the 
                                                          
595 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d at 676. 
596 Id. 
597 Id. at 681. 
598 Id.at 681. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F.Supp.3d 837 (E.D.Wisc.2014), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.2014). 
599 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d at 682. 
600 Id.  
601 Id. at 682. See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.2014). 
602 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d at 682. 
603 Id. 
604 Id. 
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Supreme Court holding in Crawford’s facial challenge left open the possibility for the plaintiffs 
to bring a successful as-applied challenged to S.B. 14.606  
 The Veasey district court found that the plaintiffs sustained their legal burden of showing 
a violation of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because S.B. 14 substantially burdened the 
franchise, and the State failed to offset these burdens with an evidence-based justification.607 The 
court stated, “It is too easy to think that everyone ought to have a photo ID when so many do, but 
the right to vote of good citizens of the State of Texas should not be substantially burdened 
simply because the hurdles might appear to be low.”608 As did the Frank lower court, the court 
issued a permanent injunction of the law and mandated Texas return to its prior ID provisions.609  
State Constitutional Challenges 
 Amongst the state constitutional challenges, most courts under the Burdick balancing test 
found either the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving impairment of voting rights or 
state interests outweighed any burden on voting.610 Predating Crawford, the Georgia legislature 
passed the 2005 Photo ID Act regarding acceptable identification for in-person voting to protect 
against fraud.611 The law required registered voters in Georgia who vote in person to show one of 
six forms of government issued photo ID.612 If the voter lacked an ID, then the vote affirmed 
their identity and cast a provisional ballot.613 More stringent than Crawford, the law mandated 
                                                          
606 Id. 
607 Id.at 693.  
608 Id. 
609 Id. at 707. The State filed an emergency stay of the injunction pending the appellate process, and the Fifth Circuit 
granted the stay. Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014).The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed staying the 
enforcement of the injunction. Veasey v. Perry, 574 U. S. ____ (2014).  In 2015, the Fifth Circuit granted the 
plaintiffs a rehearing. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015).  Since the same judicial relief was available 
under the discrimination claims in violation of the Voting Rights Act, the appellate court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
First and Fourteenth Amendment claims per the constitutional avoidance doctrine. Id. 
610 Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. 720 (2011). 
611 Id. 
612 Id. Prior law allowed Georgia voters to identify themselves presenting on of 17 forms of photographic or non-
photographic identification to election officials. Id. 
613 Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 720.  
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the voter return with an ID within two days of the election for the ballot to count.614 Finally, the 
city only provided photo voter IDs for a fee.615  
This case began when plaintiffs challenged the 2006 Act based upon violations to 
Georgia’s Constitution, including Article II, Section I, Paragraphs II616 and III617 as an 
unauthorized qualification on the fundamental right to vote and denying equal protection of the 
law under Georgia’s Equal Protection Clause.618  The trial court found the 2006 law violated 
none of these provisions and granted summary judgment in favor of the State.619  
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia evaluated each claim in turn.620 First, regarding 
the undue burden on the right to vote, the plaintiffs alleged that the Georgia Constitution 
expressly states the qualifications to vote, and this list is exclusive.621 The court dismissed this 
argument stating the Act does not affect voter registration, which requires no photo 
identification.622 The Act also does not impose a condition on voting because registered voters 
may choose a method of voting that requires no photo ID.623 Finally, the requirement is not an 
impermissible qualification on voting either because the 2006 Act does not prevent any voter 
from casting a ballot since they may obtain a free photo ID at their county locations.624 
                                                          
614 Id. at 720-21. 
615 Id. at 721. In 2005, in Common Cause/Ga. I, a federal district court granted a preliminary injunction of the Act 
because it imposed a poll tax violating the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. Id. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 
406 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1369–1370, 1377 (N.D.Ga.2005). While on appeal, the Legislature amended the law in 2006 
and eliminated the fee charged for the voter ID card. Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 721. 
616 Art. II, Sec. I, Par. II provides: “Every person who is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Georgia as 
defined by law, who is at least 18 years of age and not disenfranchised by this article, and who meets minimum 
residency requirements as provided by law shall be entitled to vote at any election by the people. The General 
Assembly shall provide by law for the registration of electors.” Id. at 724. 
617 Art. II, Sec. I, Par. III provides that no person convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude or judicially 
determined to be mentally incompetent may vote. Id. at 727. 
618 Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 723. 
619 Id. at 724. 
620 Id. 
621 Id. 
622 Id. at 725. 
623 Id. at 725. 
624 Id. at 726. 
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Regarding the equal protection claim, the plaintiffs argued the trial court failed to 
independently evaluate their claims under the Georgia Constitution because the state constitution 
provides greater protections under its equal protection clause than does the U.S. Constitution.625 
Again, the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed this claim because the court has repeatedly stated 
that the Georgia clause is “coextensive” and “substantially equivalent” to the federal clause.626  
Then applying the Burdick balancing test, which the court called the Anderson balancing 
test, 627 the court identified a legitimate state’s interest in eliminating the potential for voter fraud 
at the polls.628 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, clearly failed to establish the law burdened 
voting rights because they only offered testimony of one voter who did not possess a requisite ID 
because of age and physical infirmities, but ultimately voted with an absentee ballot.629  
To mitigate the alleged voting burdens, the state submitted evidence of a comprehensive 
education program since 2007 to inform election officials and voters of the new requirements.630 
Also, the new law was implemented in 15 elections during 2007 and 2008 without reported 
problems.631 Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court found the 2006 Act to impose only a “minimal, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory restriction.”632  
Justice Robert Benham began his dissenting opinion by discussing the nation’s extensive 
history of denying the franchise to various groups of citizens.633 He acknowledged that while 
requiring government-issued photo identification may seem reasonable in the twenty-first 
                                                          
625 Id. at 728. 
626 Id. 
627 The balancing test used by the courts is interchangeably referred to as the Burdick test, Anderson test, or 
Anderson-Burdick test.  
628 Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 729. 
629 Id. 
630 Id. 
631 Id. at 729-30. 
632 Id. at 730. 
633 Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 730 (Benham, R., dissenting). 
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century, the qualification is quite burdensome on those citizens living at “the margins of our 
society (i.e., the poor, infirm, and elderly).”634 Plus, Justice Benham pointed out that cases of 
voting fraud have not been proven to occur at any significant rates.635  
His main issue was the majority assertion that the 2006 Act does not burden citizens 
since they may obtain a voter ID card “free of charge.”636 Benham pointed out that obtaining the 
free voter ID card is more burdensome than registering to vote.637 In addition, while absentee 
voting may be preferable for the physically immobile, Justice Benham took issue with the 
majority presenting it as an option that mitigates all of the difficulties of the in-person photo ID 
requirement.638  
A challenge to Oklahoma’s ID law presented a rare plaintiff, a single registered voter, 
bringing a state constitutional claim in Gentges v. State Election Board in 2018.639 Before the 
law, each voter only had to announce his name to the precinct judge to verify the person’s name 
in the precinct registry.640 As addressed in Santillanes, Oklahoma voters in 2010 approved the 
following Voter ID Act, which required in-person voters to present a government- or tribal-
issued photo ID containing the voter’s name and an expiration date.641 As an alternative, a person 
may present a voter ID card.642 If a person is unable to produce an ID, the state allows the voter 
to sign a statement swearing to their identity and cast a provisional ballot.643 The plaintiff brought 
                                                          
634 Id. at 731. This contrast with the district court ruling in Applewhite where the court found the ID requirement to 
reasonable given the broad context of photo ID usage in daily life. Cf. Applewhite v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD 2012, *29 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
635 Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 731 (Benham, R., dissenting). 
636 Id. at 732. 
637 Id.  
638 Id.  
639 Gentges v. State Election Bd., 2018 OK 39,*1 (Okla. 2018).   
640 Id. 
641 Id. at *2. See Okla. Stat. tit. 26, § 7-114 (2010). 
642 Gentges v. State Election Bd., 2018 OK at *2.  
643 Id. 
80 
 
this action against the State Election Board claiming that the law is a condition on the right to 
vote in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution.644 
 The district court found the voter ID law not to violate the state constitution.645 Even with 
the mass of evidence below, the district court ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of 
proof that the law impinged unconstitutionally on the free exercise of suffrage rights.646 
Although the plaintiff presented evidence that a quarter of the state’s population lacked a driver’s 
license or state-issued ID, the percentage was deemed inaccurate by the court because it did not 
subtract the portion of the population under age 18.647 Second, State Senator Judy McIntyre 
testified that Oklahoma ranks 44th in the nation regarding people living in poverty.648 McIntyre 
noted that transportation is a cost-prohibitive issue for many people living in poverty who are 
unable to pay someone to take them to obtain a driver’s license or state ID.649 Finally, the 
plaintiff presented statistical evidence showing the insufficiency of provisional ballots as an 
alternative.650 For example, in the November 2010 election, voters cast 700 provisional ballots, 
but the state ultimately counted only 117.651 
 On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, or without 
deference to the lower court.652 Assuming the plaintiffs demonstrated a burden on voting rights, 
the reviewing court began its analysis by considering the intent of the law.653 The State argued 
                                                          
644 Id. The Oklahoma Constitution provides that elections should be free and equal and that “[n]o power, civil or 
military, shall ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage by those entitled to such right.” Id. at 
*4. See Okla. Const. art. 2, § 4, art. 3, § 5. The Constitution also grants the Legislature power to “prescribe the time 
and manner of holding and conducting all elections, and enact such laws as may be necessary to detect and punish 
fraud in such elections.” Gentges v. State Election Bd., 2018 OK at *4. See Okla. Const. art. 3, § 4. 
645 Gentges v. State Election Bd., 2018 OK at *4.  
646 Id. at *4. 
647 Id. at *2.  
648 Id. at *3. 
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651 Id. 
652 Id. at *4.  
653 Id. at *6. 
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that the law was intended to prevent future cases of fraud, even with no evidence provided of 
prior in-person voter fraud.654 Accepting the State’s rationale, the court found the Oklahoma law 
analogous to the Indiana law in Crawford.655 Based on the State's attempt to prevent voter fraud 
as outweighing any burden on voting rights, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared the lack of 
evidence of in-person fraud in the state was not a barrier to reasonable preventative legislation.656  
Then, the court used Crawford as a baseline for deciding the case and engaged in a point-
by-point comparison between the Oklahoma and Indiana law to show the Oklahoma law is not as 
harsh as the previously-approved Indiana law.657 While Oklahoma does not provide free photo 
identification cards for voters as Indiana does, the state does provide free paper voter ID cards, 
which voters may use in lieu of a photo ID.658 Also, a voter with no identification can vote by 
provisional ballot at a polling location with no further trips required.659 In contrast, Indiana 
voters are required to make a second trip to prove their identity before the circuit court clerk 
within ten days of the election.660 Since the Oklahoma Voter ID Act selected provisions appeared 
less stringent than Indiana, the law procedurally ensures voters meet exiting qualifications, and 
the court found no direct cost to vote, the state Supreme Court considered it constitutional.661  
Finally, Pennsylvania’s law presented the lone constitutional challenge wherein a court 
subjected a voter ID law to strict scrutiny. In October 2012, plaintiffs challenged Pennsylvania’s 
Act 18 requirement of an acceptable form of photo identification containing a name, photograph, 
                                                          
654 Id.  
655 Id. at *7. 
656 Id. 
657 Id. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).  
658 Gentges v. State Election Bd., 2018 OK at *7.  
659 Id.  
660 Id. at *6.  
661 Id. at *7. Given the nuanced differences of ID laws, as seen in the earlier state-by-state comparison, this type of 
analysis can minimize actual impacts on subsets of the population in any given state. 
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and expiration date for in-person voting.662 In Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
among their arguments, plaintiffs alleged that the law would disenfranchise or deter qualified 
voters from exercising their fundamental right to vote.663 The Pennsylvania Constitution 
explicitly provides the right to vote in Article I, Section 5.664  
Before enactment of the ID law, the only photo ID requirements applied to first-time 
voters as per the federal Help America Vote Act, which sets voting requirements for federal 
elections.665 As an alternative to a photo ID, prior law allowed voters to present one of several 
forms of non-photo ID containing their names and addresses, such as a utility bill.666  
Act 18 also provided for a list of acceptable “alternate IDs” available for voting, 
including student IDs, care facility IDs, and military IDS.667 Voters could also obtain a secure, 
non-driver ID without a fee from a Department of Transportation office.668 Since the state 
deemed the ID as secure, lots of supporting documents were required, and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court declared the ID did not allow for liberal voter access compelled by the statute.669  
To address the ruling, Pennsylvania created the Department of State ID, or DOS ID, 
which is valid for ten years and used only for voting.670 Unlike the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation ID, the only supporting documents required for the DOS ID are that an applicant 
                                                          
662 Applewhite, et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 2012 WL 3332376, *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
663 Id.  
664 Id. “Elections shall be free and equal; and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage.” Id. at 9. See Pa. Const. art. I, § 5.  
665 Applewhite, et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., No. 330 MD 2012, *2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)  
666 Id.  
667 Id. 
668 Id. 
669 Id. at *3. 
670 Id.  
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completes an application with their social security number and signs an affirmation form.671 The 
Department of State then confirms the applicant is a registered voter in the statewide database.672  
Initially, the Commonwealth Court, analogous to a state appellate court, denied the 
plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the state law for the November election.673 The Court explained that 
a citizen’s “equal right to vote” is not absolute, but competes with the state’s interest in 
preserving the integrity of its elections.674 Then, employing the federal “flexible” Burdick 
balancing standard as discussed in Crawford, the court reached the same conclusion the U.S. 
Supreme Court did on the similar Indiana law.675 The court found the photo ID requirement to be 
a reasonable, non-discriminatory, and non-severe burden on the franchise given the broad 
context of photo ID usage in daily life.676 Also, the court deemed the State’s interest in protecting 
public trust in elections legitimately sufficient to outweigh the burden on individual rights.677  
Upon appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the lower court ruling was vacated and 
remanded.678 The majority opinion agreed with the plaintiffs that the statute seemed to violate 
constitutional norms in the short term.679 The court added that the current facial challenge might 
be sustainable even if the State may validly enforce the statute in the long-term.680  
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672 Id.  
673 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2012 WL at *29.  
674 Id. at *22. 
675 Id. at *29. 
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677 Id. 
678 Applewhite, et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 54 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. 2012). The dissenting opinion 
primarily took issue with the majority remanding the case and giving the state another opportunity to defend the law, 
instead of reversing the lower court and granting the injunction themselves. Id. at 6. The dissent stated, “Forty-nine 
days before a Presidential election, the question is no longer whether the Commonwealth can constitutionally 
implement this law, but whether it has constitutionally implemented it.” Id.  The judge added that despite the 
majority’s acknowledging that the “most judicious remedy” would be to grant the injunction. Id. Instead, the 
majority “ignore[s] the election clock” and gives Pennsylvania another opportunity to justify the rushed application 
of the law. Id. 
679 Id. at 5-6. 
680 Id. at 6. 
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On remand, a different district judge, Judge Bernard McGinley, granted the preliminary 
injunction and enjoined enforcing the ID law for the 2012 Presidential election.681 This time, the 
Commonwealth Court explained that a law is facially unconstitutional when “a ‘substantial 
number’ of its applications are unconstitutional, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.’”682 The Court finds Act 18 failed to pass the facial challenge test because the 
State failed to provide a compliant photo ID for all qualified electors.683 The court says, “Like a 
house of cards, everything rises and falls upon the legitimacy of the DOS ID.”684 The court 
added the Department of State ID is an unauthorized agency creation that is difficult to obtain.685  
The Commonwealth Court found the voter ID law violated the fundamental state 
constitutional right to vote.686 The court cited Pennsylvania precedent that forbids regulating the 
right to vote when the law denies the franchise, or “make[s] it so difficult as to amount to a 
denial.”687 Thousands of Pennsylvania electors lack a compliant photo ID, and the alternate IDs 
do not remedy this situation since Department of State IDs are only available to registered 
electors, not all qualified voters.688 Also, the State subjects voters to additional burdens in 
                                                          
681 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *1.  
682 Id. at *17. 
683 Id. at *18.  
684 Id.  
685 Id. 
686 Id. Pennsylvania was one of the original thirteen colonies. Id.  
687 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *19. See Winston v. Moore 244 Pa. 447, 457 
(1914).  
688Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *19. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides for 
the following “Qualifications of electors”: “Every citizen twenty-one years of age [lowered to 18 years of age by the 
twenty-sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution], possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled to vote 
at all elections subject, however, to such laws requiring and regulating the registration of electors as the General 
Assembly may enact. 
1. He or she shall have been a citizen of the United States at least one month. 
2. He or she shall have resided in the State ninety (90) days immediately preceding the election. 
3. He or she shall have resided in the election district where he or she shall offer to vote at least sixty (60) 
days immediately preceding the election.” Id. See Pa. Const. art. I, § 5. Article VII, Section 1.  
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obtaining a Department of State ID at limited locations, during limited times, and run the risk of 
improper denial due to database issues.689  
To provide context for the subjectivity of judges’ views on the availability of a free ID 
option, an Alabama district court in 2018 found the availability of a free ID to mitigate any 
burdens on voting rights.690 The court stated that these IDs are available during regular business 
hours at various locations, including Secretary Merrill’s office at the Capitol, any county Board 
of Registrar’s Office, or wherever the Secretary’s mobile ID unit is visiting on a given day.691 
Moreover, the court held that “the individual plaintiffs’ situations demonstrate that people who 
want a photo ID can get one.”692 Finally, Judge Scott Coogler viewed the voter ID law by stating, 
“The impact of the law should not be measured by how many people lack a given ID at a given 
point in time, but by whether someone without an ID can easily get one.”693 
Given the magnitude of these burdens implemented for the first-time on Pennsylvania 
voters, Applewhite provides a rare example wherein a court subjected the ID law to strict 
scrutiny.694 Under this level of analysis, the state first bears the burden of proof at showing a 
compelling state interest in implementing the law in the upcoming election.695 The state 
                                                          
689 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *20.  
690 Cf. Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 1275. Another case not involving a voter ID 
challenge, instead challenged a law that decreased the time political parties had to gather nomination signatures from 
21 months to about seven months. In the reasoning, the judge contrasted ballot-access cases, to voting-access cases, 
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ballot. Libertarian Party of New Hampshire v. Gardner, 843 F.3d 20, 32 (1st Cir. 2016).  
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693 Id.  
694 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *20. Similarly, in League of Women Voters v. 
Walker, dissenting Justice Shirley Abrahamson stated the right to vote is “a sacred right of the highest character.” 
League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360, 393 (Wis. 2014) 
(Abrahamson, S., dissenting). Accordingly, the franchise should be the most protected of rights “because [it is] 
preservative of all rights.” Id. at 394.While the State may require a voter to identify their identity, Abrahamson 
wrote that Act 23 severely restricts the forms of identification that enable a qualified voter to cast a ballot, which 
justifies strict scrutiny. Id. at 399-422. 
695 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *20. 
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identified election integrity and ensuring public confidence in the election system as the state 
interest.696 Although Crawford acknowledged these as important interests, Pennsylvania did not 
support these interests in implementing the voter ID law with evidence.697  
Under the second prong of strict scrutiny, the state also had to show the law was narrowly 
tailored to meet the state interest of maintaining election integrity.698 Given prior elections 
accepted various types of ID, the burdens of the new ID law appeared unnecessary and not 
narrowly tailored.699 The court also found the law to unreasonably restrict the acceptable forms 
of photo IDs.700 For example, employee IDs for school districts, welfare cards, bus passes with a 
picture, gun permits, and drivers’ licenses from another state were all deemed unacceptable.701 
The court found the few accepted alternate IDs not to be “a sufficient bandage” to repair 
the obstacles of the voter ID law since the state only accepts IDs from discrete groups, such as 
the elderly and college students.702 Further, many university student IDs do not comply because 
they lack an expiration date, and many long-term care facilities do not issue photo IDs.703 
Also, the State claimed the Department of State ID provides for liberal access to an 
acceptable ID.704 Since this option is only available to registered voters, unlike in other states, 
Pennsylvania failed to provide a “safety net” for other qualified voters to access a ballot.705 The 
court highlighted options from other states, such as Kansas and Georgia allowing voters to 
                                                          
696 Id. 
697 Id. 
698 Id. at *21. 
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705 Id. at *22-23.  
87 
 
present expired drivers’ licenses.706 Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, and Wisconsin have allowed voters to present student IDs without an expiration 
date.707 Even Indiana has allowed voters to affirm they are registered voters at their polling place 
and cast a ballot based only on their affirmation to prevent disenfranchisement.708 The court 
found that Act 18 unconstitutionally disenfranchised thousands of qualified voters who lacked a 
compliant photo ID and violated the state constitution’s fundamental right to vote.709  
In conclusion, the Santillanes plaintiffs argued an inherent First Amendment interest 
exists with exercising the franchise in front of their peers, echoed by dissenting opinions.710 In 
Veasey, a district court striking down Texas’s ID law, recognized the mistrust of alternative 
modes of voting for historically disenfranchised groups, like African Americans.711 The Veasey 
judge even quotes Reverend Johnson’s testimony about how many African Americans celebrate 
voting as part of their “freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of speech,” 
and implying that in-person voting evokes the individual autonomy and self-realization values.712  
Two cases, however, found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof, such as 
the testimony of one lone voter in Perdue.713 Alternatively, three courts found that the states’ 
interests in preventing fraud and protecting election integrity were sufficient to justify any 
burden on voting rights without requiring proof of how the laws promoted these interests.714 
                                                          
706 Id. at *23.  
707 Id. 
708 Id. 
709 Id. at *24.  
710 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d  at 606. 
711 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d at 676-77. 
712 Id. 
713 Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, 288 Ga. 720 (2011) and Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 
F.Supp.3d 1253 (N.D. Ala. 2018).  
714 Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008); League of Women 
Voters of Wisconsin Educ. Network v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360 (Wis. 2014); Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018 
OK 39 (Okla. 2018). 
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Finally, in Applewhite, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court subjected the ID law to strict scrutiny.715 
As noted in the Conclusion, strict scrutiny is not always fatal to a state ID law, but requires states 
to provide good-faith reasons for not accepting specific types of ID.716 
  
                                                          
715 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD 2012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
716 Douglas, supra note 139, at 186. 
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis found few examples in which courts explicitly used First Amendment 
rationales and any associated free expression values when addressing voter ID laws. More 
commonly, courts applied the Burdick balancing test for upholding the ID law and identified two 
common rationales: either the plaintiff did not meet their burden of proof or the state interests 
outweighed any burden on voting rights. A few courts even engaged in comparative analysis 
between state laws as a justification for upholding certain laws. This thesis, however, 
recommends that courts review all voter ID laws under a strict scrutiny analytical framework, as 
the court did in Applewhite.717 The “narrowly tailored” prong requires states to justify deeming 
certain types of identification as unacceptable.718  
 Out of the seven cases analyzed, three presented U.S. Constitutional challenges and four 
were based on state constitutional challenges. Of the three U.S. Constitutional challenges, courts 
deemed two voter ID laws constitutional.719 The district court in the southern district of Texas in 
Veasey v. Perry, however, declared Texas’ law unconstitutionally violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.720 Of the four state constitutional challenges, courts deemed three laws 
constitutional.721 Only a district court struck down the Pennsylvania law as unconstitutionally 
burdening the state’s explicit provision providing a fundamental right to vote.722  
                                                          
717 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD 2012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). 
718 The highest level of judicial scrutiny is strict scrutiny, where the burden of proof lies upon the government to 
show a compelling state interest and that the law is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. Douglas, supra note 139, 
at 190. A state would only lose an election law case on the compelling state interest prong if the state fails to support 
with evidence that enacting the law was about combatting fraud or promoting election integrity. Id. The narrowly 
tailored inquiry does not require states to exhaust every conceivable form of ID, but does mandate a good faith 
consideration of workable alternatives and weighing the costs and benefits of accepting each type. Id. at 192-93.  
719 The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008) and Greater 
Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F.Supp.3d 1253 (N.D. Ala. 2018).  
720 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627, 693 (S.D. Texas 2014). 
721 Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, 288 Ga. 720 (2011); League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Educ. 
Network v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360 (Wis. 2014); Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018 OK 39.  
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Regarding research question one, only a single court opinion analyzed for this thesis 
analyzed whether a voter ID law infringed on First Amendment free expression as a separate 
claim from the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. In Santillanes, a district court 
opinion that predates Crawford, the ACLU of New Mexico, unsuccessfully argued that voters 
engaged in “core political speech” when they go to the polls to exercise the franchise in front of 
their peers.723 They argued that voting was a symbolic gesture like waving a picket sign in the 
street, which conveys a public message about the importance of democracy or representative 
government.724 This argument implicitly invokes Meiklejohn’s self-governance value, a societal 
value for free expression.725 The Court, however, found that the plaintiffs conflated voting with 
“core political speech” in a traditional public forum.726 The Supreme Court has long held that 
polling places are a limited public forum where states may place reasonable restrictions to 
protect voting.727  
 Relating back research question two, the opinions do not explicitly discuss any societal 
expression values when addressing challenges to voter identification laws. One court, the Veasey 
v. Perry district court, however, implicitly evoked the individual values of autonomy and self-
realization.728 The district court elaborately described Texas’s history concerning racial disparity 
in voting.729 The judge even quotes Reverend Johnson’s testimony attesting to how many 
                                                          
723 ACLU of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 506 F.Supp.2d at 642. 
724 Id. The dissent in Perdue made a similar argument about an inherent First Amendment interest coupled with the 
franchise, which the judge described as the right to be among one’s fellow citizens a the polling precinct and to 
openly exercise their right to participate in democracy. Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 733 
(Benham, R., dissenting). 
725 Meiklejohn, supra note 236, at 3.  
726 ACLU of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 506 F.Supp.2d at 642 
727 Id. 
728 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014). 
729 Id. at 633.  
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African Americans celebrated voting as part of their “freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and freedom of speech.”730 
Regarding Emerson’s description of autonomy,731 black people fought throughout history 
to be able to express their ideas at the ballot box, without fear of censorship.732 As previously 
discussed in the literature, Emerson articulated four key values of freedom of expression in The 
System of Freedom of Expression.733 Emerson’s four values include: 1) encouraging self-
realization, 2) attaining truth, 3) participating in political decision-making, and 4) promoting 
orderly change within society.734 The fight of African Americans to obtain the vote and the 
ability to exercise the franchise freely allows fulfillment of these values.735  
Relating to Baker’s self-realization value, Texas’ history of voter discrimination violates 
the principle of “dignity and equal worth” of individual members of the community.736 Baker 
advocated for a broad “liberty model,” or system of individual free expression.737 Baker’s model 
required the community to respect “the dignity and equal worth” of individual members, which 
could be applied to provide equal access to the ballot box.738 
 More often, the five court opinions upholding voter ID laws followed Crawford’s 
mandate and applied the Burdick balancing test. Two lines of themes exist in the rationales for 
upholding the laws. Either the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate a 
significant burden on voting rights, or given the burden on voting rights, the state justifications 
for the law outweighed the individual burdens.  
                                                          
730 Id. at 677. 
731 Coyle, supra note 274, at 25. 
732 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d at 676-77. 
733 Coyle, supra note 274, at 25. 
734 Id. at 25-26. 
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 The plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof in two of the five cases, Perdue and 
Greater Birmingham Ministries.739 From these cases, the researcher noted what insufficient 
proof of burdening voting rights and what sufficient proof has been considered. First, in Perdue, 
the judge discounted the testimony of one voter with disabilities who ultimately voted with an 
absentee ballot.740 The Georgia Supreme Court also found the burden of the law mitigated by the 
state’s education efforts and the duration the law had been in effect.741  
Second, an Oklahoma district court did not accept statistics about the percentage of the 
population lacking required photo ID without properly identifying impacts on specific 
demographic subgroups.742 The Oklahoma court also did not rely on only expert testimony about 
how transportation costs are cost-prohibitive for individuals living in poverty or the insufficiency 
of alternative voting methods.743 Instead, the court preferred actual, individual accounts of voter 
hardship. Finally, an Alabama district court ruled a state’s history of voter discrimination 
standing alone as insufficient to show a burden on voting rights.744  
On the other hand, Veasey v. Perry, is the only case that successfully challenged a law 
under the U.S. Constitution under the Burdick balancing test.745 To demonstrate a burden on 
voting rights, the plaintiffs provided a wealth of evidence, including historical evidence of 
Texas’ pattern of voter discrimination along with specific legislative history surrounding the 
voter ID law itself.746 For example, this was the Texas legislature’s fourth attempt at passing an 
                                                          
739 Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, 288 Ga. 720 (2011) and Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 
F.Supp.3d 1253 (N.D. Ala. 2018). 
740 Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 729.  
741 Id. 
742 Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018 OK at *2.  
743 Id. at *3. 
744 Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F.Supp.3d at 1272. 
745 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Texas 2014).  
746 Id. at 633-45. 
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ID law, and each time, the bill was increasingly strict.747 Also, the plaintiffs presented testimony 
from actual voters who tried to overcome the obstacles of the law to obtain an ID and failed, 
along with the associated specific costs of obtaining the supporting documents for a state-ID.748  
 Even when plaintiffs demonstrated a burden on voting rights, three of the five cases ruled 
that state justifications for ID laws outweighed the burden on voting rights.749 Citing Crawford, 
the Santillanes, League of Women Voters, and Gentges courts stated that preventing voter fraud, 
modernizing election procedures, and restoring public trust in elections were sufficiently 
important reasons to justify burdening voting rights.750 Even given Alabama’s documented 
history of voter discrimination, Judge Scott Coogler found in Merrill further support for the law 
by stating that Alabama did not act on its own in enacting an ID law, but just joined in a growing 
national trend.751 Overall, courts were deferential to the alleged state interests for enacting ID 
laws. The 2018 Gentges district court best expressed this deference to combatting voter fraud, 
“While there is no evidence of prior in-person voter fraud in Oklahoma, the Voter ID Act was 
intended as a procedural regulation to prevent future in-person voter fraud.”752 The lack of 
evidence was not a barrier to reasonable preventative legislation.753  
                                                          
747 Id. at 645. 
748 Id. at 682. 
749 Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008); League of Women 
Voters of Wisconsin Educ. Network v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360 (Wis. 2014); Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018 
OK 39. 
750Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. 
Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008); League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Educ. Network v. Walker, 357 
Wis.2d 360 (Wis. 2014); Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018 OK 39 (Okla. 2018). Specifically, in Crawford, the 
Court held that the state interest in preventing actual or perceived fraud justified the ID law, and stated that the lack 
of evidence of past instances of voter fraud in Indiana was unimportant in justifying the law. Crawford, 553. U.S. at 
192-97. Drawing from campaign finance cases recognizing the state interest in combatting the perception of 
corruption, Justice Stevens found that voter confidence further justified the law. Id. 
751Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F.Supp.3d at 1273.  
752 Gentges v. State Election Board, 2018 OK at *7. 
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The reasoning of these courts, however, contradicts recent literature regarding voter 
fraud. In fact, in an article published in the Harvard Law Review the same week as the Crawford 
decision,754 A Harvard government professor, Stephen Ansolabehere, and a Stanford law 
professor, Nathaniel Persily, found that a large share of the public perceived voter impersonation 
occurs very often (9 percent) or somewhat often (32 percent).755 On the other hand, respondents 
who perceive greater voter fraud are no less likely to turn out to vote.756 The researchers also did 
not observe any difference in perceptions of fraud based on whether the respondent lived in a 
state with a strict voter law or not.757  Regardless, Crawford continues as the reigning precedent 
for the next generation of ID laws, such as requiring proof of citizenship to combat noncitizen 
voting.758  
In response to research question three, cases analyzed under state constitutions had more 
explicit provisions for plaintiffs to argue the right to vote was a fundamental right.759 In 
Applewhite, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held elections are “free and equal” under the state 
                                                          
754 Persily, supra note 101, at 126. See Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the 
Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. 
REV.1737 (2008). Researchers, Justin Grimmer, Eitan Hersh, Marc Meredith, Jonathon Mummolo, and Clayton 
Nall, note the general problems with available election data in their 2018 article, Obstacles to Estimating Voter ID 
Laws’ Effect on Turnout. Justin Grimmer et al., Obstacles to Estimating Voter ID Laws’ Effect on Turnout, 80 J. 
POL. *1 (2018). Such problems include burdensome request procedures for administrative records and inconsistent 
data collection from state-to-state. Id. For example, the researchers replicated a 2017 study that found voter ID laws 
decreased turnout among minorities and showed their results were a product of inaccuracies in national survey data 
used. Id. (citing Hajnal, supra note 2.) 
755 Persily, supra note 101, at 126.  
756 Id. at 126. 
757 Id. Since Crawford, the voter fraud controversy became more intensely political following the aftermath of the 
2008 ACORN voter registration drives fraught with errors. Id. 
758 Persily, supra note 101, at 126. A federal judge struck down on Monday a provision of Kansas’s 2011 law, 
known as the Secure and Fair Elections Act, which required proof of U.S. citizenship to register to vote. Even 
though the decision will likely be appealed, the ruling could make voter registration easier and bring Kansas into 
alignment with § 5 of the National Voter Registration Act, which provides that voter registration applications can 
only require the minimum amount of information necessary for a state to determine a voter’s eligibility. Fish v. 
Kobach, 2018 WL 3017768, *1 (D. Kan. June 18, 2018) 
759 Applewhite, et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 54 A.3d 1, 18-20 (Pa. 2012). According to a 
professor of law, Joshua Douglas, forty-nine states provide a state constitutional right to vote, and the only state that 
does not include explicit language granting the right to vote is Arizona.  Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote 
Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 101 n. 73 (2014). 
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constitution when elections are public and open to all qualified electors alike.760 Similarly, the 
dissenting opinion in League of Women Voters v. Walker declared that the right to vote was “a 
sacred right of the highest character.”761 Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson 
added that the state explicitly confers the right to vote upon all qualified individuals in Article 
III, Section 1 of the state constitution.762  
The state constitutional challenges also provided courts with greater justification for 
analyzing ID laws under the highest level of judicial scrutiny, strict scrutiny. In Applewhite, the 
district court hinged assessing the burden of the law on the availability of a free state-issued 
ID.763 The court found the ID was only available to registered electors, not all qualified ones, and 
that the state only offered the ID at limited times and locations.764 Thus, the court found the law 
imposed a severe burden on the right to vote and thus invoked strict scrutiny.765 This same 
argument failed in a U.S. Constitutional challenge because, in Greater Birmingham Ministries, 
the court found that the free state-issued ID mitigated any burden on individual voting rights.766  
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the burden shifts to the government to show both a 
compelling state interest for the law and the law is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.767 
While citing Crawford and acknowledging preventing fraud and protecting the integrity of 
elections as important state interests, the Applewhite district court on remand required evidence 
                                                          
760 Id. at 18-19. See Pa. Const. art. I, § 5. Article VII, Section 1 for the exclusive list of elector qualifications.  
761 League of Women Voters v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d at 393 (Abrahamson, S., dissenting). 
762 Id. See Wis. Const. art. III, § 1 for the list of elector qualifications. The majority circumvented this argument by 
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of how the law promoted these interests.768 In contrast, the Santillanes, League of Women Voters, 
and Gentges courts applied lower levels of judicial scrutiny and readily accepted the state 
interests without demanding documentation. Thus, a professor of law, Joshua Douglas, said that 
a state would only lose an election law case on this prong of strict scrutiny if the state fails to 
support with evidence that the law combats voter fraud or promotes election integrity.769  
Strict scrutiny also required the state to show the law was narrowly tailored to promote 
the compelling state interest.770 Although the Supreme Court has not provided a detailed 
discussion of the narrowly tailored prong in election law cases, the Applewhite district court 
analysis provides an example since this prong was at the “meat” of the controversy.771 The court 
found the state failed to justify the law as narrowly tailored because the state deemed various 
forms of ID, such as employee IDs, welfare cards, and bus passes with photos, as 
unacceptable.772 
Professor Douglas explained that narrow tailoring does not require the state to exhaust 
every conceivable alternative form of ID, but does mandate a good faith consideration of 
workable alternatives.773 The court added that narrow tailoring does mandate weighing the costs 
and benefits of accepting certain types of ID with any practical alternatives.774 In Applewhite, 
Pennsylvania never explained why the above forms of ID were deemed unacceptable.775 While 
strict scrutiny has given plaintiffs the highest chances of success, the literature states that if 
                                                          
768 Id.  
769 Douglas, supra note 139, at 190. 
770 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *21. 
771 Douglas, supra note 139, at 191. See Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *21. 
772 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *21. 
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courts reviewed all election law challenges under strict scrutiny and gave states “a limited degree 
of leeway” to regulate elections, many of the decisions would yield the same result.776  
Professor Peter Rubin described three purposes served by the narrowly tailored 
analysis.777 First, this prong ensures the stated purpose of the law matches the actual purpose and 
“smoke[s] out” any illegitimate purposes.778 Second, this analysis checks stereotyped thinking 
and biases.779 Third, even when some genuine distinction exists between two groups, this inquiry 
assures that the distinction will only be used to the degree necessary for achieving the 
government purpose.780  
 Another trend in cases, like Gentges v. State Election Board, is where the court initially 
engaged in the prescribed Burdick balancing test and then reinforced upholding the law with a 
point-by-point relative comparison of select provisions of the Indiana ID law approved in 
Crawford.781 In upholding the Oklahoma law, the court found that although Oklahoma did not 
provide a free photo ID, the state did provide a free voter ID card that voters could use at the 
polls.782 Also, if an Oklahoma voter showed up without an ID, the law permitted the voter to cast 
a provisional ballot without any subsequent trips to verify identification.783 Since the law was 
found to be less strict than the Indiana law, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the law.784 In 
contrast, when the district court struck down Pennsylvania’s law in Applewhite, the court found 
                                                          
776 Douglas, supra note 139, at 186. 
777 Id. at 192. See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny 
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the state failed to provide a “safety net” for qualified voters who lacked even a free state ID, such 
as states like Kansas and Georgia that allow voters to use expired driver’s license to vote.785  
When the Supreme Court in Crawford examined the nuances of the Indiana law, they had 
little other evidence in the record than just the provisions of the ID law. In fact, Justice Scalia 
warned in his concurring opinion that the lead opinion’s record-based resolution of the case 
provides no certainty for future cases.786 Case certainty, however, is not the only consideration. 
Since election law is a state power, Burdick dictates that courts balance both the burden on 
voters’ rights and the state interests in each case with record-based evidence on both sides. 
Scholarship presents Crawford as dictating to lower courts that their primary job will be to carve 
out exceptions for disadvantaged individuals and groups by voting laws.787  Courts have a 
governmental obligation to serve as a voice for oppressed minority voters and should avoid 
engaging in a relative comparative analysis with other states.  
While most voter identification law opinions analyzed for this thesis engaged in the 
Burdick balancing test as prescribed in the Crawford decision, they are inconsistent in their 
approach.788 The opinions identify the subgroups affected by a given law, and most judges have 
required actual evidence of hardship. As discussed earlier in Veasey v. Perry, plaintiffs should 
err on the side of providing the court with a variety of specific information about the burdens of 
the voting law and actual testimony of disenfranchised voters.789 As the appellate court stated in 
Santillanes when rejecting the lower court’s conjectural instances of voter disenfranchisement, 
“The court deals in probabilities, not possibilities.”790 Relative comparisons between states 
                                                          
785 Applewhite v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 330 MD at *22-23. 
786 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, A., concurring). 
787 Persily, supra note 101, at 127. 
788 Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
789 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d at 682.  
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minimize the burdens experienced by voters because types of accepted ID can vary greatly from 
state to state, and each ID not accepted can impact a unique subset of that state’s population. 
Then, judges decide whether this burden on voting rights is substantial or not. 
On the other hand, most courts readily accepted the state’s interests of preventing voter 
fraud and improving elections integrity as legitimate state interests without requiring any further 
evidentiary support. Without adequate evidence on the other side of the equation, the cases used 
varying levels of judicial scrutiny in cases with similar facts. Two ID cases stated they were 
applying intermediate scrutiny, and only one applied strict scrutiny.791 Although the other four 
cases did not explicitly state the level of scrutiny applied, the courts analyzed each law with great 
deference to the state alleged interests.792  
Since courts have no predetermined test for determining a standard of review, Justice 
Breyer recommended a test in his dissent in Crawford.793 Breyer stated that a severe burden on 
voting rights and a weak threat of fraud justifies heightened or strict scrutiny.794 As stated earlier, 
plaintiffs have a better chance of proving a severe burden on voting rights if the state constitution 
explicitly provides a fundamental right to vote.795  
Breyer added that less extreme cases call for some form of intermediate scrutiny, 
requiring the state to show its statute substantially relates to an important government interest.796 
Here, most courts tend to conflate facial challenges, as in Crawford, where the law can only be 
                                                          
791 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598, 606 (D.N.M. 2007) and Veasey v. Perry, 
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struck down if it is unconstitutional in all of its applications with the as-applied standard, which 
depends on a plaintiff’s unique circumstances.797 On a facial challenge, the standard is very high 
for plaintiffs to show the law is unconstitutional in all applications, so the Court accepted 
government interests of preventing voter fraud and protecting election integrity without more.798 
Of all the cases analyzed, only two applied intermediate scrutiny, and only the district court in 
Santillanes required evidence of voter impersonation and fraud.799 That court stated the city put 
forth no past allegations of voter fraud in municipal elections and only one alleged instance in 
the 2004 presidential election, which the court deemed insufficient and struck down the law.800  
Since the Indiana law was not yet in effect, the Crawford court indicated that the law 
should be upheld on its face because the true extent of the constitutional burden remained 
unknown at the time of litigation.801 The Court added, when the burden of the law could be better 
understood, a proper as-applied challenge may lie.802 Now, as more of these laws have been in 
effect in 34 states, voter ID laws disenfranchise voters in each election, which is a constitutional 
injury, and as-applied cases are now ripe.803 For courts to properly assess the burden on unique 
subsets of the voter population, such as Ms. Smith, a Wisconsin voter born in Missouri in 1916 
without a birth certificate, the courts also need to understand the full extent of the problem the 
state seeks to combat with the statute.804 For future as-applied challenges, it is incumbent upon 
courts to seek evidence-based justification for these important state interests, such as voter fraud, 
                                                          
797 Persily, supra note 101, at 96. 
798 Crawford, 553. U.S. at 192-97. 
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and explanations for not accepting various forms of ID for many of the reasons stated by 
Professor Rubin, such as smoking out illegitimate purposes, stereotypes, and biases.805  
If courts fail to properly balance burdens on voting rights and specific state issues, such 
as voter fraud, then literature suggests a myriad of legislative options. The first group of 
suggestions does not replace voter ID laws, but instead provide supplemental provisions to 
enhance voter access, which some states have adopted.806 First, states could provide a free state-
issued photo ID option as Indiana does.807  Second, states could distribute photo IDs using 
mobile buses to visit isolated rural areas and low socioeconomic areas, as Alabama does.808 
Third, states may hold provisional ballots for a few days following an election until a voter 
returns with a photo ID, as Wisconsin and Georgia do.809 Most expansively, states can follow 
fourteen states that allow Election Day registration and immediately let the newly registered 
person vote.810   
Literature also suggests alternatives for voters who lack photo ID when the cost of 
obtaining supportive documentation may be cost-prohibitive.811 First, states should provide and 
accept free non-photo voter ID cards, as Oklahoma does.812 Second, if a voter lacks acceptable 
ID, the state could allow the voter to cast a provisional ballot and verify their identity using 
signature matching, as Florida and Washington do.813 Similarly, states could require voters to 
                                                          
805 Douglas, supra note 139, at 192. 
806 Overton, supra note 66, at 674-77. 
807 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. at 186. 
808 Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F.Supp.3d at 1275. 
809 WIS. STAT. §5.02(6m) and 6.79(2)(a) (2014) and GA. CODE ANN. §21-2-417 (2010). 
810 Automatic Voter Registration and Modernization in the States, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voter-registration-modernization-states (last visited June 11, 2018). 14 states 
— California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming — plus the District of Columbia, currently or will soon permit Election Day 
registration, which allows voters to register or update their existing registration on Election Day. Id.  
811 Overton, supra note 66, at 678-79. 
812 Gentges v. State Election Bd., 2018 OK at *7 
813 FLA. STAT. §101.043 (2016) and WASH. REV. CODE §29A.40.160(7)(a) (2017). 
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complete an affidavit affirming their identity before casting a provisional ballot, as Delaware and 
Idaho do.814  
More practically, states should mandate a potential voter present photo identification at 
registration to verify identity and eligibility, instead of when voters reach the polls.815 Given 
rapid technological advances, a voter registrar could take a photo of each voter during 
registration and cross-reference photo database from the state’s motor vehicle office to create a 
digital picture polling book for precinct workers to quickly verify a voter’s identity, when voters 
have images in the state’s motor vehicle office databases.816 In the near future, debate regarding 
privacy concerns will likely arise surrounding the possibility of creating a biometric or 
thumbprint voter verification databases.817  
In addition, literature recommends that states implement better election administration 
practices.818 Following the federal Help America Vote Act mandate, states already should have 
statewide voter registration databases.819 Now, states should pass mandates for voter registrars to 
coordinate with other agencies to ensure removal of voters who die, move, or receive felony 
convictions.820 By regularly updating voter rolls, states will also be able to regularly collect data 
on voter fraud issues to re-evaluate the effectiveness of voter ID laws.821 Finally, antifraud 
legislation should also focus on government officials, especially partisan ones, who administer 
elections and have more opportunity than voters to determine election outcomes.822  
                                                          
814 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §4937 (2017) and IDAHO CODE ANN. §34-1106(2), 1113, and 1114 (2017). 
815 Overton, supra note 66, at 678. 
816 Id. at 679. 
817 Id. 
818 Id. at 680. 
819 Id. 
820 Id. 
821 Id. 
822 Id. 
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Finally, a nationwide photo ID requirement could be the most streamlined option, if 
properly implemented.823 First, a nationwide ID law would provide an effective solution to 
concerns about voter fraud, both real and imagined.824 Second, one consolidated law would 
eliminate confusion among voters and elections officials about acceptable forms of ID.825  
Regardless of any reforms adopted, states should still engage in active voter education 
campaigns to educate the public about the acceptable forms of ID required to cast a ballot. 
Although the Santillanes district court ruling predates Crawford, the New Mexico district court 
in Santillanes found the city’s lack of educational efforts regarding the ID law imposed a 
significant burden on voting rights.826 The Tenth Circuit, however, after Crawford, noted that an 
ID law could not be struck down based on lack of educational efforts alone.827 In post-Crawford 
case law, the Georgia Supreme Court in Perdue stated that voter education campaigns mitigated 
any burden of voter ID laws on voting rights.828 Thus, even if a law cannot be struck down for 
lack of voter education, states may still benefit in the Burdick balancing test if voter education is 
part of the statutory rollout.  
This thesis found few cases where courts found that voting implicated First Amendment 
freedom of expression rights, except for two opinions discussing an inherent “First Amendment 
interest” coupled with the franchise, described as the right to be among one’s fellow citizens at 
the polling precinct and to openly participate in democracy.829 More commonly, courts applied 
the Burdick balancing test when assessing ID laws and upheld most laws showing deference to 
                                                          
823 Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy Source, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1154 (2006). 
824 Id. 
825 Id. 
826 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36. 
827 The Am. Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d at 1322.  
828 Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, 288 Ga. at 729 
829 Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 642 and Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v. 
Perdue, 288 Ga. at 733 (Benham, R., dissenting). 
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the states’ interest in preventing voter fraud and protecting election integrity. From these cases, 
plaintiffs should provide courts with a wealth of evidence to demonstrate the burden of the ID 
law on voting rights, including the state’s history of discrimination, legislative history, actual 
testimony from disenfranchised voters, and actual costs to obtain supporting documents.  
Also, for courts to properly balance interests, the Burdick test mandates states prove the 
important state interests addressed by the voter ID law. Without such, courts are unable to apply 
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.  Literature suggests that even with 34 states having 
voter ID laws, the public perception of voter fraud is unwavering. Likewise, courts cannot 
address the effectiveness of these laws without complete information about the problem.  
The cases analyzed for this thesis indicated that plaintiffs have a greater chance of 
receiving strict scrutiny analysis from a court if the state constitution explicitly provides for a 
fundamental right to vote. Literature suggests that even if courts applied strict scrutiny in all 
election law cases, the holdings in most cases would be the same.  
Strict scrutiny analysis places the burden of proof on the government to show two things: 
a compelling state interest and how the law is narrowly tailored to meet this interest. While 
Crawford acknowledged voter fraud and election integrity as important state interests, the 
compelling state interest prong mandates proof of how the law addresses these interests. Then 
courts have required states to engage in good-faith consideration of alternative forms of ID and 
give justifications for deeming certain forms of ID as unacceptable under the narrowly tailored 
prong of the analysis.  
This research area could benefit from future quantitative research studies to generalize 
the minimal level of proof courts accept to show significant burdens on voting. More analysis 
could also focus upon state constitutional challenges, possibly on a longer-timescale starting 
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before Crawford in 2008 to examine the impact of the ruling on how courts examine ID laws 
against state constitutional provisions. Finally, a study could examine the analytical framework 
courts utilize when examining laws regarding ballot-access for political candidates and compare 
this analysis with voting-access cases.   
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